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FOREWORD FROM THE PUBLISHER
There is little doubt today that environmental issues, notably climate change, 
are among the greatest challenges that mankind must face in the twenty-first 
century. Effectively addressing these problems requires action on many fronts, 
and many emphasise the need for individual lifestyle changes and voluntary 
action in the corporate sector. Nevertheless, because of its potential to bring 
about large-scale changes, public policymaking can arguably be the most ef-
fective in driving a shift toward sustainability. 
This book offers an insight into some of the most important questions of 
environmental, and specifically, climate policy. It presents the fundamentals, 
including the basic tools and principles of environmental regulation and the 
drivers and effects of global warming, and also describes the current state 
of play, with a look at the evolution of international agreements and specific 
measures in the field of climate policy. For the latter, the book focuses on the 
policies of the European Union, which has perhaps the most highly developed 
system of regulatory instruments in the world in this field. While highlighting 
some promising developments that have occurred so far, the book makes a 
clear case that the current policy response to the climate change issue is alto-
gether far from adequate, and points in the direction of further steps that could 
be taken to remedy this.
The volume is published as part of the series of the Institute for Geography, 
Geoeconomy and Sustainable Development (GEO Institute), entitled Corvinus 
Geographia, Geopolitica, Geooeconomia. Questions of long-term sustainable 
development – including environmental economics, environmental policy and 
corporate sustainability, long term competitiveness – are central themes of 
the research and education activities of our Institute. The other important as-
pect of our work is the geopolitical dimension – with a focus on international 
agreements and policy harmonisation at the EU level, this viewpoint is also 
represented in this book. We are therefore pleased to present it to students, 
professionals and all readers interested in deepening their knowledge about 
these important issues.
Géza Salamin
Director, CUB GEO Institute
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the centuries since the industrial revolution, mankind has witnessed unprec-
edented economic development, which, alongside its enormous benefits, has 
also led to increasing problems in the environmental domain. Over the past 
decades, these problems have received increasing attention in public policy-
making, gradually leading to the development of a sophisticated toolbox of 
measures designed to encourage companies and individuals (alongside the 
public actors themselves) to make decisions that are less detrimental to the 
environment. From outright bans and performance standards to economic in-
centives such as taxes and subsidies, and many other tools, various policy 
approaches can be adopted and different instruments work best in relation to 
different problem areas and target sectors. Moreover, while the theory of en-
vironmental economics offers valuable insights into the fundamental mecha-
nisms and characteristics of these instruments (see Kerekes et al. 2018), in 
practice, a myriad of details must be worked out in order to develop policies 
which perform as intended.
Perhaps the most complex and salient environmental issue of our time, cli-
mate change, is an area where the policy tools applied by countries across the 
world today are as diverse as the sources responsible for the problem. From 
huge CO2 emitters in industry and the power sector to the millions of cars on 
the road and boilers in homes, from burning forests in tropical areas to waste 
landfills and cows belching methane, all of us are involved in causing global 
warming and we will all be (or indeed already are) affected by its consequenc-
es. Achieving the necessary shift toward decarbonisation in all these sectors 
while making sure that the economic and social costs are kept to a minimum 
is indeed a great challenge for policymakers, requiring them to make wise use 
of the full toolkit at their disposal – and perhaps even to implement hitherto 
untested solutions.
A very important component of environmental policymaking today is the 
international dimension. The importance of this dimension is readily appar-
ent with an issue such as climate change, which is global by nature and re-
quires international cooperation to be addressed effectively. However, even 
with environmental issues where the problem itself is more local, the related 
policies often have important international implications because they impact 
the competitiveness of regulated sectors. Taking a harmonised approach to 
environmental protection can therefore help to bring into being more ambitious 
policies. Today, the European Union level represents the highest degree of 
the international harmonisation of environmental regulations – in some areas, 
targets are set at the Community level, while the measures for achieving them 
are left in the hands of Member States, but there are also areas where com-
mon rules dictate all the details. Multilateral environmental agreements, such 
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as ones which address climate change, of course involve a much lower level 
of policy harmonisation, but they also point in this direction.
The aim of this book is twofold: first, it offers a general overview of the most 
important tools of environmental policy and the main features of and current 
trends in EU environmental policy. Second, it presents the issue of climate 
change, including drivers, impacts and the current standing of international 
efforts to address it. Finally, these two themes are combined in a detailed dis-
cussion of the climate policy of the EU. (While many – in fact, nearly all – policy 
areas have implications for climate change, this book only addresses those 
measures and strategies that are directly aimed at reducing  greenhouse gas 
emissions and does not discuss topics such as economic, development or 
trade policy.)
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2. INSTRUMENTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
Environmental pollution is the addition of substances or energy to the envi-
ronment at a rate faster than it can accommodate (Nathanson 2018). Some 
pollutants (such a CFCs) are entirely man-made, but many also occur natural-
ly. Some substances are toxic and cause adverse effects even in very small 
amounts, while others only become a problem at much higher levels. CO2, for 
example, is a natural component of the Earth’s atmosphere and is only consid-
ered pollution since emissions due to human activity now exceed the capacity of 
natural ‘sinks’ (such as forests and oceans) and contribute to dangerous climate 
change. Examples of polluting forms of energy include noise, heat, and light 
pollution. Sources of environmental pollution can be classified as point sources 
or diffuse sources. The former refer to sources that emit large amounts of a cer-
tain pollutant in one place, such as power plants and factories. Diffuse pollution 
comes from sources that are scattered and individually small but together may 
cause significant problems, such as cars, households, and agricultural fields.
Environmental policy uses a wide range of instruments to address various 
forms and sources of pollution. From bans and emission standards to taxes, 
tradable pollution permits and simple awareness raising, policymakers can 
choose from a variety of tools to influence the behaviour of economic actors in 
the desired direction. When deciding which policy instrument to use in a given 
situation, there are several issues to consider (Richards 2000, Mickwitz 2003, 
Goulder-Parry 2008):
•	 Effectiveness refers to whether the given policy instrument is able to 
achieve the desired environmental outcome. This question arises be-
cause decision makers do not have access to perfect information when 
designing environmental policy, which gives rise to uncertainty when 
using certain types of instruments. 
•	 Efficiency refers to the cost of achieving the desired environmental out-
come, which should be as low as possible. Comparing the cost efficien-
cy of various environmental policy tools is a central task in environmental 
economics. The theory shows that the total cost of reducing pollution 
by a defined amount is minimized if pollution is always minimized by the 
polluter who can do this in the cheapest way.1 This can be ensured if a 
policy allows economic actors the flexibility to decide how much and by 
what means they can reduce their pollution. In the long term, the cost ef-
ficiency of environmental policy instruments also depends on the extent 
that they are able to foster innovation; i.e., to motivate companies to 
develop new, cheaper methods for reducing pollution. In practice, these 
1 This means that the marginal abatement costs for all polluters should be equal (see 
Kerekes et al. 2018, Chapter 5).
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factors should be complemented by considering the administrative costs 
associated with policy implementation.
•	 ‘Fairness’ - in addition to the latter factors, it is clearly also necessary to 
take into account the social impact and political acceptability of environ-
mental policy measures. The main question here is how the costs (and ben-
efits) of a policy will be distributed among different groups (e.g. the polluters 
themselves versus the rest of society; high versus low income groups, etc). 
Acceptance of a policy may also be influenced by the characteristics of the 
adoption process itself (transparency, stakeholder consultations, etc.)
The instruments of environmental policy are usually classified into three main 
groups: direct instruments, indirect instruments, and soft measures. In the fol-
lowing, the characteristics of these groups and the specific measures that are 
applicable to each group will be discussed. 
2.1. Direct instruments 
Direct instruments (also known as regulatory instruments or ‘command and 
control’ approaches) introduce specific limits on environmentally harmful be-
haviour. Tools in this group include:
•	 Bans on substances or products which are considered environmentally 
harmful 
•	 Technology standards which mandate the use of certain technologies 
to control pollution
•	 Performance standards (also known as emission standards/limits/
norms) which put a limit on the amount of pollution that may be gener-
ated by each polluter 
Direct instruments are the oldest and most widely used tools of environmen-
tal policy. Their main advantage is effectiveness, since the required pollution 
reduction is defined at the outset and is therefore guaranteed (assuming that 
the regulations are effectively enforced). On the other hand, direct instruments 
are not cost efficient because they are inflexible, requiring the same reduc-
tion of pollution from all economic actors, regardless of cost. Regarding flex-
ibility, there is also a difference between technology standards and perform-
ance standards; the former being the most rigid, while the latter at least allow 
companies to choose the cheapest method of meeting the prescribed targets. 
Another disadvantage of direct instruments is that they do not create any mo-
tivation for companies to reduce their pollution below regulatory limits (Stavins 
2002). It follows from the above that direct instruments are best applied in situ-
ations when effectiveness is more important than cost – namely, in the case of 
pollutants that are dangerous to human health or otherwise highly damaging.
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2.2. Indirect instruments
Indirect instruments are also known as economic (or market-based) instru-
ments because rather than prescribing a fixed method or target for reducing 
pollution, they rely on creating an economic incentive for polluters to improve 
environmental performance. The main types of indirect instruments are:
•	 Taxes (charges/fees) that require the payment of a certain sum after 
each unit of pollution that is released into the environment 
•	 Subsidies paid by authorities to polluters if they reduce their emis-
sions/adopt environmentally friendly practices
•	 Permit trading systems whereby the authorities issue a certain number 
of pollution permits that polluters are required to acquire to the extent 
that they wish to pollute
With the above instruments, polluters can freely decide how much they wish 
to reduce their pollution and will do so as long as they are able to do this at a 
lower cost than the cost of continuing to pollute (i.e. paying taxes or buying per-
mits). (Subsidies also work by effectively creating a cost for pollution; namely, 
the income the polluter foregoes by continuing to pollute.) Compared to direct 
instruments, the main advantage of economic instruments is the cost efficiency 
that their flexibility creates. Polluters who are able to reduce their pollution more 
cheaply will be motivated to reduce more, while others who can only do this at a 
very high cost are not forced to do so. Therefore, the overall cost of achieving a 
given reduction will be as low as possible.2 Furthermore, economic instruments 
create a continuous incentive for pollution reduction as there is no threshold be-
low which pollution is free of charge. Polluters will therefore always be motivated 
to search for new, cheaper methods of reducing pollution. The main downside 
of indirect instruments is the higher degree of uncertainty regarding their effects. 
This is because authorities have no way of knowing exactly how much polluters 
will reduce their pollution when faced with a certain cost. The geographical dis-
tribution of the reductions can also be very uneven (Stavins 2002). This means 
that economic instruments are not the best choice when dealing with dangerous 
forms of pollution; in other cases, however (such as greenhouse gas emissions 
or non-hazardous waste) they represent a more efficient and market-friendly al-
ternative to command and control regulation. 
2  This only refers to the cost of the pollution reduction itself. From the polluters’ per-
spective, economic instruments (such as taxes) may sometimes be more expensive 
than performance standards because, in addition to the cost of reducing pollution, 
the former also have to pay for any remaining pollution. From the point of view of 
society, however, taxes paid by polluters represent simple transfers of money from 
polluters to authorities rather than a true cost - it is therefore only the actual cost of 
making reductions that should be minimized.
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2.2.1. Environmental taxes
The use of taxes or charges to control environmental pollution is based on en-
vironmental economic theory which stipulates that the external costs resulting 
from environmental pollution should be internalised (charged to polluters) so 
that pollution is reduced to a level that can be considered optimal to society3 
(Pigou 1920).
In practice, several questions need to be answered when designing and en-
vironmental taxes (OECD 2010): 
•	 What	should	be	the basis for the tax? Theoretically, this should be the 
pollution itself, as this gives polluters the maximum flexibility in choos-
ing the optimal means for its reduction. However, in practice the cost of 
directly measuring emissions may be too high (especially in the case of 
diffuse sources) thus inputs such as energy or raw materials may serve 
as a good proxy (taxing gasoline, for example, is much more viable 
then individually measuring the CO2 emissions from every car). In some 
cases, taxing polluting products may also be a practical option (this 
strategy is usually applied in relation to waste management objectives; 
e.g. taxing certain packaging materials).
•	 How	high	should	 the	 tax rate be? Here, the theory of environmental 
economics dictates that the tax rate should be determined based on 
the size of the externality (that is, the damage caused by the pollution)4 
. Once again, there are several practical problems with this approach. 
Firstly, estimating the amount of damage is highly challenging and 
fraught with uncertainty.5 Second, applying a tax rate corresponding to 
the social costs of pollution may not be feasible for political reasons. 
(For example, several studies have shown that the social cost of road 
transport in the form of accidents, air pollution, noise, etc. would justify 
3 Externalities are unintended economic effects that impact the welfare of a third party 
who is not involved in the transaction. Pollution is a typical example of a negative ex-
ternality because it creates costs for others (air pollution, for example, may damage 
health, reduce property values and agricultural yields, etc.). Because polluters do 
not bear these costs themselves, they will not take them into account when making 
production-related decisions and may continue to pollute even when the social cost 
of doing so outweighs the benefits of continuing the polluting activity and/or the cost 
at which the pollution could be reduced.
4 More precisely, the tax rate should be equal to the marginal cost of pollution at the 
socially optimal level (the point where the marginal cost of pollution is equal to the 
marginal benefit from the polluting activity) – see Kerekes et al. 2018)
5 The economic valuation of the environment is a field of environmental economics 
that addresses this issue. Several methods have been developed to estimate the 
cost of pollution and environmental degradation (see Marjainé Szerényi 2005), and 
environmental decision-making is increasingly making use of these techniques, al-
though theoretical and practical problems with this approach continue to persist.
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fuel and/or other transport taxes that are much higher than currently 
applied [CE Delft et al. 2011, Gössling et al. 2019], but doubling or tri-
pling the rates of taxes – which are already perceived by motorists to be 
very high – is something elected decision-makers are unlikely to risk.) 
If tax rates are not defined according to the size of the externality, they 
should be determined based on the desired environmental improve-
ment that the tax is intended to achieve. (Of course, as noted before, 
authorities do not have perfect knowledge about the pollution reduction 
costs of private actors, so they can only estimate what tax rate would 
be necessary to achieve the desired pollution reduction.)
 In reality, the amount of public revenue to be generated from the new 
tax can also be an important consideration. It should be noted that the 
effects of a tax may also vary greatly depending on the characteristics 
of the goods in question. As a result of taxation the price of goods 
will increase, thereby decreasing consumption, but the size of this de-
crease is much greater for some goods than for others.6 (Taxing plastic 
bags, for example, leads to a dramatic reduction in their use because 
consumers can easily switch to using paper or textile bags instead, 
while taxing a vital good such as gasoline will result in a far smaller 
reduction in consumption.) This also means that the environmental im-
provement that can be expected from any tax is inversely related to the 
income that it will generate.
•	 What	 are	 the	 social/economic consequences of the tax? This of 
course depends on who will ultimately bear the cost of the tax (those 
who are ultimately affected may not be the actors who originally pay the 
tax – companies might under certain circumstances be able to pass on 
extra costs to their customers). It is especially important to consider the 
potential negative effects a tax may have on disadvantaged groups – en-
ergy taxes, for example, tend to disproportionately burden low-income 
households since they have to spend a relatively large proportion of their 
income on energy bills. When companies (notably industrial companies) 
pay such taxes, the resulting costs might threaten their international 
competitiveness. In such cases, measures that counter the undesired ef-
fects of the tax might be justified; however, it is important to design these 
compensatory measures in such a way that they do not undermine the 
original environmental goals. Exceptions or lower tax rates for vulnerable 
consumer groups or industries are therefore not desirable. Instead, poli-
cymakers can introduce other measures to help disadvantaged groups 
(such as, for example, reducing the value added tax rate for basic food-
6 This characteristic of goods is known in economics as the price elasticity of demand, 
and mainly depends on the availability of suitable substitutes for the good in ques-
tion.
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stuffs, or increasing social payments), or help industry adapt to the new 
taxes by offering support for energy efficiency investments. 
•	 How should the revenue generated by the tax be used? (The com-
pensatory measures mentioned above are, of course, one possibility.) 
A popular solution is to dedicate the revenue from environmental taxes 
to solving environmental problems (e.g. use the money from taxes on 
fossil fuels to fund energy efficiency or renewable energy investments) 
– such ‘earmarking’ may increase the political acceptability of environ-
mental taxes and ensure that at least a minimal amount of funding is 
dedicated to environmental policy. However, it is necessary to point out 
that there is no theoretical connection between the amount of revenue 
generated by an environmental tax (the tax rate, as described above, 
being dependent on damage caused by pollution) and environmental 
protection investment needs  (infrastructure for waste and wastewater 
treatment, clean technology investment, etc.), so the related decisions 
are best made independently. This means that revenue from environ-
mental taxes can simply be used like any other source of government 
revenue (to finance general government spending, to reduce public 
debt, or to decrease other taxes).
The latter idea – that revenue from environmental taxes can be used to de-
crease other taxes in a way that creates benefits for society – is known as 
environmental tax reform and has generated much interest in recent decades 
(OECD 2017). Levying a huge share of taxes on labour, as is currently done 
in most countries, is detrimental to employment rates and economic growth 
alike. Reducing labour taxes and replacing the related government revenue 
using new or increased environmental taxes therefore has the potential to in-
crease employment and generate environmental benefits at the same time – an 
effect known as the ‘double dividend’. (The most commonly suggested form of 
such a tax shift is to increase taxes on fossil fuels and reduce social security 
contributions or personal income tax rates.)
Empirically testing the results of an environmental tax reform and proving the 
existence of the double dividend is a very difficult task because, so far, there 
have only been modest experiments to implement such changes in practice. 
However, results from model calculations suggest that the effects of an en-
vironmental tax reform would indeed positively impact unemployment rates, 
as well as the environment (Patuelli et al. 2005, Groothuis 2016, Hogg el al. 
2016). Despite the potential benefits, implementing large-scale environmental 
tax reform is problematic because a relatively narrow circle of players (energy 
intensive, polluting industries) would have to pay the lion’s share of the new 
taxes, leading to concerns about damage to competitiveness (and of course 
strong opposition from these industries) (OECD 2017).
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2.2.2. Environmental subsidies
Instead of making polluters pay for pollution, it is of course also possible to 
positively incentivize environmentally friendly practices via subsidies. Environ-
mental subsidies take many forms, from direct grants and preferential loans 
that support environmental investment to price subsidies (such as feed-in-tar-
iffs for renewable energy generation). While not involving actual cash transfers, 
other forms of preferential treatment such as tax exemptions or reduced rates 
(e.g. for zero-emission cars) are usually also considered subsidies (Withana 
et al. 2012). Naturally, subsidies are more popular with economic actors than 
taxes (and do not raise any concerns about social or competitiveness issues) 
but for governments they represent a financial burden.
One of the main challenges of designing efficient subsidy schemes (envi-
ronmental or otherwise) is to ensure additionality – meaning that public funds 
should only be used to support action that private actors would not undertake 
at their own initiative (Bennear et al. 2013). (Energy efficiency investments such 
as replacing windows in one’s home, for example, are beneficial to the environ-
ment and also reduce heating costs. Many homeowners will therefore do this 
even without public support, while for others the initial investment cost may 
be too high. Ideally, subsidies should only be targeted at the latter group, but 
in practice of course this can be very difficult to achieve.) Ensuring the finan-
cial efficiency of such policies also means that subsidies should be as small 
as possible while still being effective – just as with taxes, finding the ‘correct’ 
rate can be challenging and rates need to be revised regularly. Subsidies are 
often used to overcome initial market barriers to new technologies (such as 
electric cars or renewable energy). In such cases, it is expected that subsidies 
will increase R&D and mass adoption, which will, over time, reduce costs and 
ultimately reduce or eliminate the need for the former.
Another important question regarding subsidies is whether they should be 
technologically neutral or technology specific. (Whether, for example, the dif-
ferent types of renewable energy such as wind, solar, geothermal, etc. should 
receive equal or differentiated levels of support.) In theory, a technologically 
neutral approach is preferable because allowing rival technologies to compete 
freely leads to a more efficient solution than policymakers ‘picking a winner’. 
In practice, however, technology-specific subsidies can be justified in several 
cases, and are indeed widely used in environmental policymaking. (With regard 
to renewable energies, for example, a technologically neutral subsidy system 
would favour those technologies which are in a more mature state of develop-
ment and therefore cheaper, such as wind, while others like solar would not 
receive any support, even though they might potentially be more promising in 
the long term [European Commission 2013].)
It was previously mentioned with regard to environmental taxes that it is 
possible to apply these systematically in the framework of comprehensive tax 
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reform. This idea can be taken further to also rethink the expenditure side of 
fiscal policy (such as subsidies and public procurement) from an environmental 
point of view – this idea is known as environmental fiscal reform. Govern-
ments apply subsidies for many reasons other than environmental protection, 
and the effect of most of these subsidies on the environment is actually nega-
tive. Typical examples of such environmentally harmful subsidies include 
subsidies for fossil fuel production, fishing fleet modernization, preferential 
tax rates for household energy consumption, aviation fuel, company cars, 
etc. (Withana et al. 2012). The scrapping of these subsidies is a logical and 
important step in environmental fiscal reform, but very difficult to implement 
because of social concerns and vested economic interests. Next to subsidies, 
public procurement processes can also be reformed to take into account en-
vironmental considerations. From low-energy buildings and electric vehicles 
to energy efficient office equipment and recycled paper, green public pro-
curement is not only useful because of its direct environmental benefits, but 
also because government purchases may be large enough to encourage the 
development of environmentally friendly products and services that may then 
be used more widely (European Commission 2016).
2.2.3. Permit trading systems
Permit trading systems are known under many names: emissions trading, 
quota trading, tradable pollution permits/emission allowances, cap-and-trade 
systems, etc. Under such systems, the authorities issue a fixed number of 
pollution permits (equivalent to the overall level of pollution that they deem 
permissible) and distribute these among polluting firms. Firms covered by the 
system can freely trade the permits among each other and may emit pollution 
corresponding to the number of permits that they possess.
Such a system has several advantages. As with other economic instruments 
such as taxes, the fact that companies can flexibly decide whether to reduce 
their pollution or to pay and continue polluting ensures that pollution is reduced 
at the lowest possible social cost. However, unlike taxes, with permits there is 
no uncertainty regarding the environmental outcome of the policy because the 
amount of pollution that is permitted is fixed at the outset by the authorities. (It 
is not the amount but the price of pollution – the permit price – which is freely 
floating and determined by the market).7 Fixing the amount of pollution that is 
permissible also means that the system can automatically adjust to changing 
7 This is only true for the overall amount of pollution, while uncertainty regarding its 
geographical distribution remains. Firms in a given geographical area may all decide 
to continue polluting and buy permits from somewhere else, leading to the creation 
of dangerous ‘hot spots’ if permit trading systems are used to regulate toxic pol-
lution. Therefore, like other economic instruments, permit trading is best suited to 
types of pollution that are not locally harmful, such as greenhouse gases.
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economic circumstances such as inflation or new entries to the market. (With 
a tax, such changes would result in increased emissions unless the tax rate 
were raised – but with permit trading, the market price for the permits would 
increase and the amounts of pollution stay the same [OECD 2004].)
An important limitation of permit trading systems is that operating such sys-
tems can be expensive. As these transaction costs increase along with the 
number of players that are involved, permit trading systems are not really an 
option for handling diffuse sources of pollution (Convery et al. 2003). (The EU’s 
Emissions Trading System for greenhouse gases, for example, only covers 
large polluters such as power plants and energy-intensive industries. Extend-
ing the system to all players who emit CO2 – such as car owners, for example 
– would clearly be impracticable: this issue is much better addressed via fuel 
and motor vehicle taxes.)
The main practical question related to the implementation of permit trading 
systems is how the permits should be initially distributed among participating 
companies. The simplest solution is to auction them off to firms. However, in 
this case, buying permits may represent a substantial additional cost to com-
panies, creating concerns about acceptability and competitiveness. It is there-
fore common practice to distribute some or all of the available permits for free 
(Goulder-Parry 2008). In this case, the next question is how to determine the 
number of permits to be given to each company. The simplest solution, called 
‘grandfathering’, is to distribute the permits based on the historical emissions 
of the participating companies. (For example, if the goal of the policy is to 
reduce participants’ total emissions by 10%, then each company will receive 
permits equivalent to 90% percent of their emissions for the past year. Indi-
vidual firms may then: a) reduce their emissions by 10%; b) reduce them by 
more than 10% and sell the unnecessary permits; c) reduce them by less than 
10% or not at all and buy extra permits from others who have reduced more.) 
While a simple approach, grandfathering is not the ideal principle according 
to which permits should be distributed because it allocates the most permits 
to companies with the highest emissions and is unfair to those who have al-
ready put in place measures to reduce their emissions prior to the implemen-
tation of the system.8 A more complicated but fairer option is to determine a 
kind of benchmark for every industry based on the best (most environmentally 
efficient) available technology. This means that companies that use the best 
available technology will find their emissions largely covered by the amount of 
permits they receive, while those that use dirty technologies will either need to 
improve drastically or spend heavily on buying extra permits (Phylipsen et al. 
2006). It is very important to note that the method of initial distribution (auction 
8 Also, a separate mechanism needs to be put in place to address the question of new 
entrants – companies which have just started operating and cannot be allocated 
permits based on their past emissions.
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or free distribution), while of great importance to individual companies, has no 
effect on the final outcome of the system (the amount of pollution or the market 
price of the permits) (Goulder-Parry 2008). 
2.3.Soft measures
Next to direct and indirect instruments, environmental policy also possesses 
a range of tools that constitute an even ‘softer’ approach (i.e. do not involve 
mandatory pollution reduction requirements or direct financial incentives). In 
an environment characterized by increasing global competition, there is sub-
stantial pressure to reduce the regulatory burden on companies. However, it is 
also clear that the severity of environmental problems does not permit public 
authorities to abandon efforts in this area (Gunningham et al. 1999). Therefore, 
the past decades have seen an increase in experimentation with alternative 
forms of regulation that may replace or complement traditional instruments. 
While there is less consensus in the literature regarding the taxonomy of these 
measures compared to the first two types (see Richards 2000), certain catego-
ries of instruments have emerged that are discussed below.
2.3.1. Voluntary agreements
Voluntary agreements, also known as negotiated agreements or covenants, 
are contracts between public authorities and private actors (usually industrial 
associations) aimed at achieving a specified environmental goal within a speci-
fied time frame (Karamanos 2001). As their name indicates, industry’s partici-
pation in such agreements is voluntary – companies usually cooperate in order 
to avoid the government introducing stricter forms of regulation (standards or 
taxes) that would be more costly to comply with (OECD 1999). This type of reg-
ulation ensures maximum flexibility as to how industry reaches the specified 
targets and is therefore cost efficient and innovation friendly. Administrative 
costs for authorities are also low, since monitoring and ensuring compliance 
by individual companies is left to industry associations. A further advantage of 
voluntary agreements is that they may foster an atmosphere of constructive 
partnership between authorities and the private sector and encourage compa-
nies to internalise their environmental responsibilities (ten Brink 2002).
However, when it comes to the environmental effectiveness of voluntary 
agreements, there are serious doubts, leading many to call into question their 
usefulness as an environmental policy tool. In many cases, the targets set in 
the agreements are unambitious, essentially corresponding to ‘business-as-
usual’. (Due to general technological development, the environmental perform-
ance of companies tends to improve over time without any specific effort – en-
vironmental policy can only be considered successful if it leads to more than 
this ‘normal’ level of improvement.) This phenomenon is known in the literature 
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as ‘regulatory capture’: when regulation is shaped by business interests in-
stead of the public interest (OECD 1999, ten Brink 2002).
Considering all the above, voluntary agreements are perhaps most useful as 
the first, easily implemented steps for addressing new, emerging environmen-
tal issues. They can be put into place fairly quickly, do not involve very high 
costs, and can create useful experience for designing future legislation about 
the issues in question (OECD 1999).
2.3.2. Supporting voluntary action
In past decades, an increasing number of companies have taken steps to im-
prove their environmental performance above and beyond legal requirements. 
A survey of the 100 largest companies in each of 49 countries undertaken by 
KPMG indicates that 72% published a corporate responsibility report in 2017 
that provided information on their environmental (as well as social) perform-
ance and programmes (KPMG 2017). The initiatives described in these reports 
are many and diverse, from technical steps such as implementing eco-effi-
ciency measures, investing in renewable energy and producing green products 
to management steps such as introducing formal environmental management 
systems, setting environmental targets, and educating employees and engag-
ing suppliers about sustainability issues, etc.9 While the sincerity of such ef-
forts is sometimes called into question, it is clear that even with the best of 
intentions it is not easy for companies to tackle these issues effectively. This 
is where public authorities come in who may help by providing guidelines and 
examples of best practice (of corporate responsibility in general, or specific is-
sues such as life cycle assessment) or independent verification (such as certi-
fied environmental management systems or eco-labelling schemes) to improve 
the quality and credibility of companies’ efforts (European Commission 2011). 
2.3.3. Provision of information
Next to mandatory legislation and private benefits such as efficiency improve-
ments, pressure from other stakeholders including customers, NGOs or the 
local population can also motivate companies to improve their environmen-
tal performance. Governments may foster this process by empowering these 
stakeholder groups, notably by ensuring that they have access to informa-
tion about companies’ environmental performance (Gunningham et al. 1999). 
9 The motivation for companies to take such voluntary steps are many and diverse, 
such as a desire to reduce risk and enhance their image, reduce energy and raw ma-
terials costs, motivate employees, attract customers seeking green products, etc. 
In recent years, investors have also become increasingly interested in companies’ 
sustainability performance, some from a risk perspective, and others out of a desire 
to invest in a socially responsible manner (BSR – Globescan 2018).
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Mandatory environmental disclosure requirements are increasingly common in 
many countries, as are schemes designed to raise the attention of consum-
ers, such as energy labels. General campaigns that aim to educate people 
and raise awareness about environmental issues can also be considered as 
belonging to this category.
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3. THE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 
The beginnings of EU environmental policy date back to the 1970s, the decade 
that marked the birth of the modern environmental movement. This was a time 
when increasing awareness about global environmental problems led to the 
creation of the international institutional framework for environmental protec-
tion (the UN’s Conference on the Human Environment took place in Stockholm 
in 1972, creating the United Nations Environment Programme) as well as ma-
jor environmental NGOs, the first green parties, and the first environmental 
ministries in several countries. The European Economic Community also de-
cided on the creation of its own environmental policy in 1972 and adopted 
an Environmental Action Programme that came into force in 1973. The body 
of environmental legislation grew steadily in the coming decades, and when 
the European Union was established through the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, 
environmental policy was explicitly listed as one of its common policy areas.
3.1. Fundamental principles
EU lawmaking is based on the principle of subsidiarity, which postulates that 
every issue should be dealt with at the lowest possible level of decision-mak-
ing – that is, the EU should only take action in situations where the desired ob-
jective cannot be effectively achieved by  Member States (Treaty on European 
Union, 1992). In the case of environmental policy, the justification of EU-level 
action rests on two main arguments (EC 2014): 
•	 The cross-border nature of many environmental problems: Pollu-
tion does not respect national borders and therefore international co-
operation is required for it to be addressed effectively.
•	 The undisturbed functioning of the European single market: Economic 
cooperation and the single market are at the heart of EU integration. Without 
coordination, different environmental policies in EU Member States would 
potentially disturb the functioning of the single market. On the one hand, en-
vironmental regulations have the potential to act as trade barriers as coun-
tries with strict regulations may deny market access to foreign products that 
do not meet their requirements. On the other hand, environmental regula-
tions may also increase operating costs for businesses, giving a competitive 
advantage to countries where environmental standards are low. The harmo-
nisation of environmental policy across the EU ensures a level playing field 
and makes it easier to aim for a high level of environmental protection (al-
though cost and competitiveness concerns related to environmental policy 
naturally remain important in relation to the outside world).
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The fundamental principles of EU environmental policy were also laid down 
in the Maastricht treaty. These are:
•	 The precautionary principle: this means that if there is a suspicion of 
risk to human health or the environment, the EU may take action to pre-
vent damage (e.g. by banning a suspicious substance) even if there is 
still scientific uncertainty and the risk has not been completely proven.
•	 Prevention and rectification of pollution at its source.
•	 The	polluter pays. This means that it is the responsibility of (potential) 
polluters to prevent damage to the environment and to rectify any dam-
age and pay compensation if damage does occur.
•	 Integration into other policy areas. This is a very important principle 
since many other Community policies (such as energy, transport and ag-
ricultural policy) can have significant effects on the environment and envi-
ronmental protection efforts can be far more successful if environmental 
considerations are taken into account when developing other policy ar-
eas (instead of an isolated strategy whereby environmental policy must 
try to rectify problems created by, for example, policies favouring road 
transport, fossil fuels, or environmentally harmful farming practices).
Aiming for alignment with these principles serves as general guidance for 
EU environmental policy but it does not mean that they are always fully taken 
into account. The precautionary principle, for example, is at the heart of several 
important measures (including, for example, the EU’s chemicals policy, its ap-
proach to the approval of GMOs, and the recent decision to ban certain pes-
ticides suspected of harming bee populations). Such decisions are, however, 
always made with difficulty because of the serious economic consequences of 
restrictive regulations; moreover, the precautionary principle is not always ap-
plied (a notable example is the case of endocrine disruptors – chemicals that 
may harmfully influence the hormonal system – which are present in several 
consumer products but which the EU has not taken concrete steps to regulate). 
Prevention of pollution is a general aim to strive towards, but it is nearly impos-
sible to fully achieve. The EU’s urban air quality standards, for example, are 
routinely breached in numerous cities, which means that stronger measures to 
reduce pollution at the source (e.g. restrict cars) would be justified. The polluter 
pays principle is not implemented in cases when subsidies are used to fos-
ter emission reductions (e.g. to support energy efficiency or renewable energy 
investments, or biodiversity-friendly farming practices). Finally, the principle of 
integration is an area where the EU has made huge steps in past decades, re-
forming related policies so they are more in line with its environmental goals, but 
the journey is far from over (which situation is illustrated by the fact that better 
integration of environmental considerations into other policy areas is listed as a 
priority in the EU’s newest (7th) Environment Action Programme – see below).
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The decision-making processes of the EU are complex and new legislation 
often takes several years to finalise and formally adopt. The three main EU insti-
tutions that are involved in the decision-making process are the European Com-
mission, the Council of the European Union,10 and the European Parliament.
•	 The	European Commission is essentially the executive branch of the 
EU. It does not have the power to adopt new legislation, but nonetheless 
plays a vital role in the policy process by drawing up legislative propos-
als for the Council and the Parliament to discuss. It is also responsible 
for the implementation and enforcement of EU law (including the man-
agement of the EU budget). The Commission is organised according to 
policy areas and consists of staff who do not represent countries or po-
litical parties but the general interests of the EU. In addition to its staff of 
~32,000 employees, the Commission also regularly consults with experts 
and stakeholders to improve the quality of proposed legislation.
•	 The	Council of the European Union is the EU’s main decision-making 
body (together with the Parliament), consisting of representatives of the 
governments of EU Member States. Each Member State has a perma-
nent staff at the Council to prepare decisions, which are then finalised 
and adopted at Council meetings attended by the ministers responsible 
for the given policy area from each country.11 While initially the Council 
made most of its decisions unanimously, the continuous enlargement 
of the EU has led to this procedure being replaced in favour of voting by 
qualified majority (at least 55% of member countries representing 65% 
of the EU’s population).
•	 The	 European Parliament is the EU’s other main decision-making 
body, currently consisting of 751 members12 elected directly by EU citi-
zens every five years. The parliament is organised according to political 
groups. In the early days, the power of the Parliament was limited to a 
mainly consultative role alongside the Council, but this has gradually 
changed and today most new legislation is passed by the Council and 
Parliament together (both may change and amend proposals made by 
the Commission, and new legislation is only adopted if the two bodies 
come to an agreement about the relevant texts – a process which may 
occasionally take years of negotiation).
10 Not to be confused with the Council of Europe, which is not an EU institution but a 
separate international organisation that mainly focuses on the area of human rights.
11  Several times a year, the EU’s heads of state or government also hold summits to 
make decisions about the most important political issues. This institution is called 
the European Council, but it only decides on the strategic direction for the EU, and 
does not pass any laws. 
12 The number will be reduced to 705 after the United Kingdom leaves the European 
Union.
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In the case of environmental legislation, the standard procedure today is the 
‘ordinary legislative procedure’ (formerly called the ‘codecision’ procedure), 
whereby decisions are made jointly by the Council and the Parliament. Re-
garding these two institutions, the Parliament has a tendency to be somewhat 
‘greener’ than the Council, so any increase in the power of the Parliament has 
a positive influence on the evolution of environmental policy. (This can prob-
ably be explained by the fact that members of Parliament are directly elected 
by EU citizens and therefore include representatives of green parties who are 
not found in the Council because the latter are rarely involved in national gov-
ernments. Also, the Parliament is generally more accessible to lobbyists – in-
cluding green NGOs – than the Council [Burns et al. 2013].) However, in some 
highly sensitive policy areas (such as taxation) decisions are still made solely 
by the Council and require unanimity, making progress in these areas more 
difficult to achieve. 
The two main instruments of EU law are regulations and directives. Regula-
tions are binding legislative acts that must be applied across the EU in their 
entirety. Directives are legislative acts that define binding goals for Member 
States to achieve, but it is up to the Members States to decide how they wish 
to achieve these goals and adopt laws to this end. (For example, the Renew-
able Energy directive of 2009 establishes the proportion of renewables from 
total energy consumption that each country must achieve, but the specific 
measures required to reach this target can be different in each Member State.) 
Alongside the specific legal instruments, the EU also has multi-annual strate-
gies (Environment Action Programmes) that lay out the overall objectives and 
priorities for environmental policy. The first EAP was adopted in 1973, while the 
current (7th) EAP covers the period 2013-2020. 
3.2. Current priorities and trends
The title of the EU’s 7th environmental action programme is ‘Living well, with-
in the means of our planet’. It identifies three key objectives (Decision no. 
1386/2013/EU):
•	 To	 protect,	 conserve	 and	 enhance	 the	 Union’s	 natural capital: this 
refers to the protection of healthy ecosystems that provide vital eco-
system services (for example, pollination, flood protection, climate 
regulation, etc.) A central element of this objective is the protection of 
biodiversity.
•	 To	 turn	 the	Union	 into	 a	 resource-efficient, green, and competitive 
low-carbon economy: this objective includes the more efficient use 
of materials by minimising and recycling waste; as well as energy ef-
ficiency, curbing the use of fossil fuels and greenhouse gas emissions.
•	 To	safeguard	the	Union’s	citizens	from	environment-related	pressures	
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and risks to health and well-being: this means reducing all forms of pol-
lution that have adverse effects on human health, such as air and water 
pollution, noise and dangerous chemicals.
It can be seen from the objectives that the EU wishes to address all possible 
aspects of environmental policy – as was also the case in the previous EAPs which 
contained much the same goals with slightly different emphases. Alongside the 
thematic objectives, the 7th EAP identifies four further goals as ‘enablers’ for the 
thematic priorities. These are very interesting because they highlight the funda-
mental challenges that constantly accompany environmental policy-making:
•	 Better implementation of legislation. The EU has been struggling 
with implementation gaps in environmental (and other) legislation for a 
long time. There has been some improvement compared to the previ-
ous decade, but the environment is still the policy area associated with 
the highest number of infringements in the EU (over 300 open cases at 
the end of 2018). (On average, infringement cases take over three years 
to resolve, and may end in Member States being fined by the European 
Court of Justice.) A study from 2011 estimates that non-compliance 
with environmental legislation costs the EU approximately 50bn EUR 
per year (European Commission 2011).  Notable examples for this 
problem are the standards for ambient air quality, with which most of 
the EU Member States continually fail to comply (see Figure 1) – result-
ing in a situation where air pollution is estimated to cause 660 thousand 
excess deaths annually in the EU (Lelieveld et al. 2019).
•	 Better	 information, by improving the knowledge base. Effective envi-
ronmental policy requires a lot of information that is not always readily 
available but which requires highly developed monitoring systems (for ex-
ample, for tracking pollution or biodiversity trends, or even new scientific 
research in less understood areas such as climate change risks or the ef-
fects of new chemicals). The EU is aiming to adopt a more systematic ap-
proach to data collection and spend more on filling the knowledge gaps.
•	 More	and	wiser	investment into environment and climate policy: this is a 
very complex goal, since it is geared not only to increasing public spend-
ing on environmental issues (the concrete target is to spend 20% of the 
EU’s budget on climate change mitigation and adaptation), but also to 
mobilising private investment. The latter can be achieved by more widely 
utilising market-based instruments of environmental policy such as envi-
ronmental taxation in accordance with the polluter pays principle.
•	 Full	 integration of environmental considerations into other policy ar-
eas: the EAP seeks to further progress in this field by relying on environ-
mental impact assessments which must accompany major new policy 
initiatives.
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Figure 1: Member States’ compliance with air pollution limit values (2016)
Source: European Commission DG Environment website
Finally, the EAP specifies two ‘horizontal’ objectives which are related to 
numerous environmental issues:
•	 To	make	the	Union’s	cities more sustainable: this is among the few truly 
new priorities in the 7th EAP. As nearly 80% of the EU’s population live 
in an urban area, the goal is to specifically address environmental is-
sues from this perspective, mainly by encouraging cities to implement 
policies that promote sustainable urban planning and design and to 
share best practices in this field.
•	 To	 help	 the	 Union	 address	 international environmental and climate 
challenges more effectively: this means, on the one hand, that the EU 
should play an active role in international cooperation (such as multi-
lateral agreements) in the environmental field. The other element of this 
priority is for the EU to consciously address the negative environmen-
tal impacts it may have outside its own borders (such as encouraging 
deforestation by creating a demand for palm oil, or overexploiting the 
oceans’ fish stocks).
The main tool of EU environmental policy is legislation, but the achievement 
of objectives is also aided by financial instruments. The EU budget is relatively 
small: at 155 bn EUR/year, it represents around 1% of the EU’s annual GDP. 
(National budgets are much larger by comparison, ranging from a low of 29% of 
GDP in Ireland to a high of 57% in Finland [OECD 2015].) The composition of the 
Budget is shown in Figure 2. It is very difficult to determine the amount spent on 
environmental protection as this expenditure is not classified under a separate 
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heading but scattered across several other areas. The title ‘Sustainable growth: 
natural resources’ is actually composed largely of the Common Agricultural Pol-
icy, the main aim of which is to provide income support to EU farmers, although 
a certain share of the payments is tied to environmentally friendly farming prac-
tices (in line with the principle of integrating environmental protection into other 
policy areas). Also under this heading is the LIFE programme, the only part of 
the budget dedicated exclusively to environmental protection, which, however 
only represents ~0.3% of the total EU budget. Far more important is the pos-
sibility to finance environmentally beneficial investments within the economic 
tranches. Cohesion policy represents the largest chunk of the budget and is 
used to support the less developed regions of the EU – activities financed in-
clude the development of environmental infrastructure (such as wastewater and 
solid waste treatment facilities), and projects for improving resource efficiency, 
etc. The funds within the competitiveness tranche can also be used to finance, 
for example, clean energy investment or related R&D activities.
Figure 2 Composition of the EU budget
Source: EUROPA website
The environmental policy of the EU is constantly evolving. Beyond specific 
measures, there are some general tendencies that characterise its current de-
velopment (some of which can be discerned from the priorities of the 7th EAP).
One such tendency is the shift in attention to include diffuse sources of pol-
lution, as well as industrial polluters. In the early days, environmental protection 
efforts were mainly focused on industrial emissions, as such large sources of 
pollution represented a logical starting point in the quest to make meaningful 
improvements. As a result of the regulations (as well as industry’s natural drive to 
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improve operational efficiency), industrial emissions have significantly declined 
over the years, so that addressing emissions from other sectors (such as trans-
port, households and agriculture) has become increasingly indispensable for 
further progress. Industry, of course, also has a huge impact on the emissions 
of other sectors via the products it offers, and regulating the environmental per-
formance of products is also an increasingly important tool in the environmental 
policy toolkit of the EU. Examples of such regulations include energy efficiency 
standards for various household appliances, CO2 emission standards for cars, 
and the ban on certain single-use plastic products that is now under discussion. 
Another trend is the expansion of the environmental policy toolkit beyond 
command and control measures and more reliance on market-based instru-
ments. Because of the advantages discussed in Chapter 2.2, the European 
Commission has been pushing for an increase in the use of market-based 
instruments in environmental policy for several years (COM(2007)140). The 
7th EAP explicitly recommends a shift in taxation from labour to pollution 
(1386/2013/EU). However, as noted before, progress in this area is very dif-
ficult to achieve because fiscal policy is still very much a prerogative of  indi-
vidual Member States. Indeed, a wide range of environmental taxes and fees 
is applied across the EU today – some of these, such as energy taxes, mo-
tor vehicle taxes, landfill taxes and taxes on certain environmentally harmful 
products are (nearly) universal, while others, such as taxes on air and wa-
ter pollution, are only applied in some Member States. However, the overall 
importance of these environmental taxes is relatively low – on average, they 
represent around 2.5% of the GDP and just over 6% of the total tax burden in 
EU countries (while labour taxes comprise around 50%), a share that has not 
increased over the past 15 years. The most important environmental taxes in 
the EU are energy and transport taxes; taxes on pollution and resources are 
very modest by comparison (see Figure 3).
Figure 3: Environmental taxes in the EU (billion EUR)
 
Source: EUROSTAT 2019
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Another overarching trend in EU decision-making that has also affected en-
vironmental policy over the past two decades is the drive for ‘better regula-
tion’. The EU has long been struggling with modest economic growth and 
the public perception that it is too bureaucratic and removed from its citizens 
(COM(2001)428, COM(2005)0097). These problems have resulted in a desire to 
improve the quality of decision-making, reduce regulatory burdens and ‘cut un-
necessary red tape’ (COM(2002) 278). The main tools of this regulatory reform 
have included an overview of existing regulations with a view towards simplifi-
cation (which resulted, for example, in dropping the much-ridiculed rules about 
the curvature of bananas and cucumbers allowed on supermarket shelves), 
increased stakeholder consultation, and the introduction of mandatory impact 
assessments to accompany major new legislative proposals (COM(2002)276). 
The aim of such impact assessments is to identify and, as far as possible, 
quantify all economic, social and environmental effects of proposed legislation 
to decide whether Community action is indeed justified, and to help select the 
best possible means of achieving the objectives. As problems that create the 
need for regulatory reform continue to persist, a better regulation agenda was 
put forward in 2015 by the Juncker Commission (COM/2015/0215). However, 
environmental NGOs are sceptical of these initiatives, fearing that they actu-
ally represent a move towards deregulation; a reduction of environmental (and 
social) standards that is driven by business interests rather than a desire to 
improve the public good (Better Regulation Watchdog 2015, Tansey 2016). 
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4. CLIMATE CHANGE – DRIVERS AND IMPACTS
Among the many environmental problems that the World is facing today, many 
regard climate change as the most serious – so serious, in fact, that United Na-
tions secretary António Guterres recently called it ‘the most systemic threat to 
face humankind’ (Sengupta 2018). In the EU, public opinion polls indicate that 
climate change (considered to be the most important among environmental 
issues by a majority of Europeans [Eurobarometer 2017]) now ranks as the fifth 
most important problem facing the EU today, ahead of issues such as unem-
ployment, inflation and crime (see figure 4).
Figure 4 Public opinion on the most important issues facing the EU
 
Source: Eurobarometer 2018
Indeed, climate change has several unique characteristics that make it more 
serious and more difficult to address than other environmental issues: 
•	 The	global	nature	of	the	issue:	driven	by	the	increase	in	the	atmospheric	
concentration of greenhouse gases, the problem is truly global and can 
only be addressed by effective international cooperation.
•	 The	deep	connection	with	the	foundations	of	our	economy:	the	current	
global economy is fundamentally reliant on fossil fuels (coal, oil and 
natural gas) which are the main source of greenhouse gases, meaning 
36 ANNA SZÉCHY: ENVIRONMENTAL AND CLIMATE POLICY
that there is no quick and easy fix for reducing emissions.13
•	 The	magnitude	and	variety	of	 effects:	 increases	 in	 the	Earth’s	global	
average temperature have an impact on nearly every aspect of life on 
Earth, from natural ecosystems to the human economy.
•	 The	long-term	nature	of	the	problem:	greenhouse	gases	emitted	today	
can spend many years (in some cases, centuries or millennia) in the 
atmosphere, all the while affecting the climate. The impacts of climate 
change are only just starting to be felt and are expected to unfold over 
several decades or even centuries, making it more difficult to convince 
decision-makers and the general public of the need to act and make 
economic sacrifices today to counter the problem. 
•	 The	risk	of	irreversible	effects:	due	to	natural	positive	feedback	mecha-
nisms in the Earth’s climate system the warming process is expected to 
accelerate and might reach a point where even a substantial decrease 
in anthropogenic (man-made) greenhouse gas emissions would not be 
sufficient to reduce it. 
4.1. The drivers of climate change
The main driver behind climate change is an increase in the greenhouse ef-
fect caused by the anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases. The green-
house effect is a natural phenomenon which plays a crucial role in shaping 
the Earth’s climate. The Earth continuously receives energy from the sun in 
the form of solar radiation. A part of this radiation is directly reflected by the 
atmosphere (‘bouncing’ off clouds or dust particles) while the rest reaches and 
warms the planet’s surface. This heat energy is then radiated back by the Earth 
into space, but a part of it is captured by certain gases in the atmosphere. 
These are the so-called greenhouse gases which act like a partial blanket, 
keeping some of the heat trapped close to the surface.14 In fact, it is estimated 
13 The issue of ozone depletion is often raised as a counterpoint to the problem of climate 
change: in this case, the gases responsible for the destruction of the ozone layer were 
used in a relatively limited range of applications and could be fairly easily substituted by 
safer alternatives once their negative effects had become known. This is probably why 
the ozone issue, even though it also required global cooperation, was addressed much 
more effectively than climate change. (The ozone layer has already started to regener-
ate, but the process is very slow because the ozone-depleting substances released 
over the previous decades will spend a very long time in the atmosphere and continue 
to do damage. However, with the passage of time they will eventually disappear and the 
ozone layer is expected to fully recover by the end of the century [IPCC 2005]).  
14 This happens because incoming radiation from the sun is of a different, shorter 
wavelength than the heat energy radiated back from the Earth. Greenhouse gases 
are those gases which allow the incoming, shorter wave radiation (light) to pass 
through, but capture the outgoing longwave heat radiation.
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that without the greenhouse effect, the mean surface temperature of the Earth, 
which is currently around 14 °C, would be a much colder -19 °C. The mecha-
nism of the greenhouse effect, and the fact that C02 is a greenhouse gas, has 
been well known since the nineteenth century (IPCC 2007).
It follows from the above that an increase in the concentration of greenhouse 
gases in the Earth’s atmosphere results in a strengthening of the greenhouse 
effect; that is, more heat energy being trapped in the atmosphere and an in-
crease in global temperature. In fact, our knowledge about the Earth’s climate 
in the past indicates a strong correlation between the atmospheric CO2 con-
centration and temperature (Figure 5). While there have been substantial varia-
tions in CO2 concentration and temperature in the past without any anthropo-
genic influence, it is clear that the currently observable increase in atmospheric 
CO2 is mainly the result of human activity, notably the use of fossil fuels that 
began with the industrial revolution.15 The atmospheric CO2 concentration prior 
to the industrial revolution is estimated to have been around 280ppm, but after 
starting to rise sharply in the second half of the twentieth century it now ex-
ceeds 400ppm16 (EEA 2018) – substantially higher than at any time in the past 
for at least 800,000 years (IPCC 2014). Therefore, the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change17 states that it is ‘extremely likely’18 that human activity is 
the main cause of the increase in global temperature that has been observed 
since the mid-twentieth century (IPCC 2014a). 
15 C02 in the atmosphere represents a stage in the global carbon cycle – a continuous 
flow of the element carbon between the atmosphere, the ocean, the soil and liv-
ing organisms that is key to sustaining life on Earth. By burning fossil fuels, we are 
quickly adding large amounts of carbon to this system that was formerly deposited 
underground and thus which had been ‘out of circulation’ for millions of years.
16 The meaning of ‘ppm’ is parts per million; that is, in every million molecules of air, 
there are approximately 400 molecules of C02. For gases present in even smaller 
amounts, ppb – parts per billion – or ppt – parts per trillion – are used.
17 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is a body of the United 
Nations whose mission is to synthesize existing research on climate change and 
provide information about trends, effects and possible future scenarios. The IPCC 
publishes a comprehensive report on climate change every seven years, the most 
recent of which appeared in 2014. With thousands of contributing experts, the IPCC 
is widely considered as the definitive source of information on climate change, al-
though the process of compiling reports and coming to a consensus about the text 
they contain is very lengthy and results in the reports lagging a few years behind 
the latest scientific results (meaning in practice that they tend to underestimate the 
magnitude of climate change).
18 In the terminology of the IPCC, ‘extremely likely’ means a probability of 95-100% 
(IPCC 2014a) .
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Figure 5 Historical evolution of temperature and atmospheric CO219 
Source: Petit et al. 1999
While CO2 is the most important of greenhouse gases, several others also play an 
important role in the process of climate change. As can be seen in the table below 
(Table 1), all of these gases are currently present in the atmosphere in higher con-
centrations then they were prior to the industrial revolution. It can also be seen from 
the table that CO2 is the most important greenhouse gas due to its quantity, which is 
much higher than that of the other greenhouse gases. On a molecule-per-molecule 
basis, however, the other greenhouse gases have a stronger warming effect than 
CO2 – this is indicated by their relative global warming potential (which is measured 
in comparison to CO2). The combination of global warming potential and quantity de-
termines the actual size of the contribution of each gas to climate change20 (Figure 6).
19 Our knowledge about the climate of the Earth in the distant past comes from drilling 
deep holes in the polar ice. The age of the ice increases with depth, thus by analyz-
ing the physical and chemical properties of each layer and the composition of air 
bubbles present within it, it is possible to determine the temperature as well as the 
atmospheric composition at the time these layers were formed.
20 For Figures 6, 7 and 8, the different greenhouse gases have been converted into 
CO2-equivalents according to their relative global warming potential.
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Table 1: Concentration, lifetime and global warming potential of selected greenhouse gases
Gas Pre-industrial concentration
Current 
concentration
Atmospheric 
lifetime 
(years)
Global warming 
potential (100-
year horizon)
CO2 283 ppm0 405 ppm variable21  1
CH4 751 ppb 1850 ppb 12 28
N2O 273 ppb 328 ppb 121 265
CFC - 12 0 ppt 505 ppt 100 10200
Source: IPCC 2014b, NOAA
Most of these gases also have natural sources,22 but the man-made con-
tribution is increasingly significant and is the main reason why their current 
concentration is higher than in past centuries (IPCC 2014b): 
•	 CO2 (carbon-dioxide), as stated before, mainly comes from the burn-
ing of fossil fuels (coal, oil and natural gas) for energy generation, but 
emissions can also be caused by land-use change, notably deforesta-
tion (when forests are cleared, the carbon stored in trees is released 
into the atmosphere and the carbon content of the soil below them is 
also reduced considerably).
•	 CH4 (methane) emissions are in part also associated with the fossil fuel 
industry (notably mining) but the agricultural sector also plays an important 
role via livestock (the digestion process of ruminant animals, such as cows, 
produces methane) and rice cultivation. Organic waste decomposing in 
landfill sites is also a source of anthropogenic methane emissions. 
•	 N2O (nitrous oxide) mostly comes from agriculture because of fertilizer use 
and animal manure, but a smaller part is the result of fossil fuel combustion.
•	 Halogenated hydrocarbons, such as CFCs, are entirely man-made 
gases that were used as refrigerants, foaming agents for plastics (such 
as insulation and packaging materials) and as propellants (for example, 
in deodorant sprays and fire extinguishers) during the second half of the 
twentieth century but were progressively phased out when it came to light 
21 It is not possible to determine a single atmospheric lifetime for CO2 as there are several 
processes whereby it is removed from the atmosphere, with some (such as photosynthe-
sis and dissolution in ocean water) occurring much faster than others (such as storage on 
the ocean floor, and in mineral deposits). This means that around one-third to one-half of 
emitted C02 will disappear from the atmosphere within a few decades, while some may 
remain there for thousands, or even hundreds of thousands of years (IPCC 2014b).
22 The most important natural greenhouse gas, and in fact the most important green-
house gas overall, is water vapour. However, the amount of this in the atmosphere 
is highly variable and mainly depends on air temperature, not emissions, so its con-
centration is therefore not directly influenced by human activity (IPCC 2014b).
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that they were severely damaging the ozone layer. (They are shown in 
Figure 6 under the name ‘Montreal gases’, the Montreal Protocol being 
the international treaty under which they were phased out.) However, be-
cause these gases spend a long time in the atmosphere, they are still 
present and contributing to the greenhouse effect today. The replacement 
products currently in use, known as F-gases (shown in purple in Figure 6), 
do not damage the ozone layer but are also powerful greenhouse gases.
The above gases are not the only ones contributing to the greenhouse ef-
fect – in fact, all gases with three or more atoms are greenhouse gases – but 
many of these only spend a short time in the atmosphere and do not have a 
significant impact on the climate. One short-term gas that is known to have an 
important role in global warming is tropospheric ozone (O3), which is created 
through a chemical reaction by sunlight and certain polluting gases (mainly de-
rived from car traffic).23 But because the concentration of tropospheric ozone 
varies significantly in terms of time and place, it is very difficult to determine its 
overall contribution to global warming (it is therefore not included in Figure 6). 
Figure 6 Contribution of various greenhouse gases to climate change  
 
Source: EEA2018
Regarding the sectoral breakdown of greenhouse gas emissions, energy is by far 
the greatest contributor, whether the former is produced by the energy sector itself (in 
23 The troposphere is the bottom layer of the Earth’s atmosphere. Under natural con-
ditions, a significant amount of ozone is only found in the stratosphere (about 20 
kms above the surface of the Earth) where it plays a useful role by neutralizing the 
sun’s harmful UV radiation. Tropospheric or ground-level ozone, on the other hand, 
is harmful because it not only contributes to climate change, but because it is also 
highly toxic and damaging to humans and other living organisms.
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power plants) or in industry or transport (Figure 7). (Of course, most of the emissions 
created in the electricity and heat sector can also be attributed to those sectors where 
this energy is used; namely, industry and buildings [IPCC 2014a].) Trends show that 
the global emission of greenhouse gases continues to grow unabated (a slight, tem-
porary reduction occurred in 2009 – the year of the global economic crisis).  (Figure 8)
Figure 7 Global man-made greenhouse gas emissions by sector, 2013 
 
Source: WRI via C2ES
Figure 8 Current trends in global greenhouse gas emissions 
 
Source: Olivier-Peters 2018, p. 11. 
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In its last assessment report, the IPCC outlined several scenarios for future 
emission trends and attempted to predict the associated increase in global 
temperature (IPCC2014a). In these models, the point of reference is always the 
temperature observed in the second half of the nineteenth century, compared 
to which the current global average temperature has already increased by 1°C. 
Because of the greenhouse gases that are already in the atmosphere, warming 
is certain to continue and will reach at least 1.5-2°C by the end of the century. 
This is the most optimistic scenario, which is only attainable if greenhouse gas 
emissions are urgently and drastically reduced. (A new report was released in 
2018 which recommends that global warming should not be allowed to exceed 
1.5°C – this would necessitate that greenhouse gas emissions be reduced by 
45% by 2030 and reach net zero in around 2050 [IPCC 2018].) In the worst 
case, if there is little effort to reduce emissions the temperature increase pro-
jected by the IPCC for 2100 is 4-5°C above pre-industrial levels. In any case, 
the temperature increase is not and will not be even across the globe, but 
generally higher over land than over the oceans, and strongest in and around 
the Arctic region (IPCC 2014a).
It is important to mention that, in addition to anthropogenic greenhouse 
gas emissions, there are several natural mechanisms which will also have 
an important role in shaping the future climate. Unfortunately, these natural 
mechanisms are mostly positive feedback loops that exist as a result of the 
temperature increase and act to strengthen it further (negative feedbacks also 
exist but the IPCC estimates that the overall effect of natural mechanisms on 
temperature will be positive). The most important of these natural feedback 
mechanisms are the following (IPCC 2014b):
•	 An	 increase	 in	 temperature	 results	 in	 more	 water	 vapour	 in	 the	 air,	
which, as previously noted, is also a greenhouse gas and therefore in-
creases warming. 
•	 Melting	 snow	 and	 ice	 results	 in	 formerly	white,	 highly	 reflective	 sur-
faces being replaced by darker ones which absorb more sunlight (this 
is known as the albedo effect).24
•	 Oceans,	which	play	a	key	role	in	removing	CO2 from the atmosphere, 
are able to do this to a reduced extent as they become saturated and 
their temperature increases.
With higher levels of global warming, there is a risk of triggering additional 
feedback mechanisms that could result in runaway climate change. There are 
currently large amounts of CH4 stored around the world in permafrost (in re-
gions such as Siberia) as well as under the ocean floor which may be released 
24 Albedo measures the proportion of sunlight reflected by a given surface and is much 
higher for snow and ice than for water and most other land surfaces.
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if the temperature increase is large enough. While it is impossible to currently 
predict the point at which this may occur, avoiding the high temperature in-
crease scenarios is also important for preventing these dangers. 
4.2. The impacts of climate change
Increasing average temperatures are expected to have a whole range of impacts 
on weather patterns and physical conditions across the globe. These will in turn 
affect natural ecosystems, as well as human society and the economy. Some of 
the impacts can already be felt today, while others are expected to unfold over the 
course of the next decades – their magnitude is of course dependent on how much 
the global temperature increases. (While there is certainly a relationship between 
the size of the temperature increase and the size of the impacts, this relationship is 
not always linear. For some effects there are likely to be ‘tipping points’ – thresholds 
above which they escalate abruptly and might become irreversible.) The most im-
portant direct impacts of climate change are the following (IPCC 2014a):
•	 Shifting	of	climatic	zones.
•	 Melting	of	 ice	and	snow	cover	 in	 the	polar	 regions	and	mountainous	
areas (glaciers). 
•	 Rise	in	global	sea	level	(as	a	consequence	of	melting	ice).	Compared	to	
the beginning of the twentieth century, sea level has risen by an aver-
age of about 20cm and this is expected to increase to 25-45cm by the 
end of this century under the different temperature scenarios.25
•	 Changes	in	rainfall	patterns:	the	contrast	between	wet	and	dry	regions	
and wet and dry seasons is expected to increase. (Dry regions will see 
even less rain and wet regions will see more.)
•	 Increased	risk	of	extreme	weather	events	(such	as	heat	waves,	floods,	
hurricanes, droughts, and wildfires). 
•	 Ocean	acidification.	 (This	 is	 in	 fact	not	a	consequence	of	 rising	 tem-
perature but results directly from an increase in the atmospheric CO2 
concentration which leads to more CO2 being dissolved in the ocean, 
lowering its PH).  
25 In the long term, the greatest cause for concern regarding sea level is the fate of the 
Greenland ice sheet. As noted before, the temperature increase is greatest in the Arc-
tic region, which is where the ice is receding most quickly. The melting of North Sea 
ice will not contribute to sea level rise, but the melting of Greenland ice will, because 
it is land ice and therefore adds water to the ocean as it melts. Scientists predict that 
a complete collapse of the Greenland ice sheet, which may well occur as a result of 
climate change and would be irreversible, would increase global sea level by as much 
as 7m, significantly altering coastlines all over the world, although this process is ex-
pected to take over a thousand years. The temperature threshold at which this may 
occur is not exactly known, but it is estimated to be between an increase of 1 - 4°C.
44 ANNA SZÉCHY: ENVIRONMENTAL AND CLIMATE POLICY
•	 Decrease	in	the	dissolved	oxygen	content	of	the	oceans.	(Warmer	wa-
ter generally contains less dissolved oxygen.)
•	 Ocean	currents	may	also	be	affected.	The	Gulf	Stream	(officially	known	
as the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation) is expected to weak-
en as a result of climate change, potentially leading to colder winters in 
Europe, although a complete collapse of the current by the end of this 
century is considered unlikely.
•	 Loss	of	biodiversity.	Biodiversity	across	the	globe	is	already	declining	rap-
idly due to human pressures (such as habitat destruction, pesticide use, 
etc.). Climate change will accelerate this process further as many species 
will not be able to adapt fast enough to changing conditions. (Coral reefs 
and polar ecosystems are the most vulnerable and are expected to suffer 
serious damage even under the lowest temperature increase scenarios.)
These direct impacts will in turn cause serious disruption to human activ-
ity around the world. The most important socio-economic effects of climate 
change are expected to be the following (IPCC 2014a):
•	 Damage	to	property	and	infrastructure	from	flooding	and	other	extreme	
weather events.
•	 Food	and	water	insecurity.	With	changes	in	rainfall	patterns,	people	living	
in dry subtropical regions will face an increase in water shortages. While 
the conditions for agriculture might improve in some cold climates, the 
overall effect on food production in tropical as well as temperate regions is 
expected to be overwhelmingly negative, with the higher temperature in-
crease scenarios posing serious threats to global food security. The global 
fish catch is also expected to decline due to ocean warming, acidification, 
and the expansion of zones with very low oxygen content (‘dead zones’).
•	 Impacts	on	human	health.	Climate	change	is	expected	to	affect	human	
health in many ways, most of which are again negative. Problems include 
deaths from heat waves and extreme weather events (while of course 
fewer people will die from cold exposure), an increase  in  disease-re-
lated risk (in relation to vector-borne diseases such as malaria as well 
as diseases related to contaminated drinking water and food poisoning) 
and worsening urban air quality. indirectly, the most significant health 
risk from climate change is malnutrition, particularly among children. The 
WHO estimates that these factors will lead to approximately 250,000 ex-
cess deaths annually during the period 2030-2050 (WHO 2018).
Overall, it is clear that countries in tropical and subtropical regions – mostly 
developing countries – will suffer most as a result of climate change, and within 
individual countries, it is again poor communities and households which will be 
the most vulnerable. In general, climate change is expected to slow down eco-
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nomic growth and make poverty reduction more difficult. To a certain degree, 
it is possible to prepare for the effects of climate change and reduce the re-
sulting damage via adaptation measures (such as improved agricultural prac-
tices, flood protection infrastructure, health care services, etc.), but again, poor 
countries and communities are the least capable of making these investments. 
It is therefore likely that climate change will increase the pressure for migration 
and could lead to the displacement of large groups of people over the next 
century, as well as raise the risk of violent conflict in many areas (IPCC 2014a). 
Numerous attempts have been made to quantify the economic damage as-
sociated with climate change. Since efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions come at a cost, it would be easier to make decisions regarding these 
investments knowing whether they are justified in cost-benefit terms.  There 
is, however, a lot of uncertainty involved in such calculations. The most widely 
publicized study of the economic impacts of climate change is the so-called 
Stern Review (prepared by Sir Nicholas Stern for the government of the United 
Kingdom in 2006). The main conclusion of the report is that failing to prevent 
climate change would lead to an economic loss equivalent to 5-20% of global 
GDP per year (continuing forever). The investment needed to avoid such a 
scenario is only ~1% of global GDP annually, so the benefits of vigorous and 
early action far outweigh the costs (Stern 2007). (Since such vigorous action 
has not been taken since the publication of the report, the cost of prevention 
is now likely to be higher.) However, the conclusions of any such analysis that 
compares present costs and effects in the distant future are heavily depend-
ent on the discount rate used in the calculations. The main criticism regarding 
the Stern Review is that it applied a discount rate that some regarded as too 
low – with a higher discount rate, future impacts appear smaller and therefore 
justify smaller prevention-focused investment (Nordhaus 2007). The choice of 
a ‘correct’ discount rate is, however, more of an ethical than a scientific issue, 
meaning that there is no objective way to decide how much sacrifice should be 
made in the present to prevent the future consequences of climate change.26 
26 Discounting is the mechanism used in finance to express how the value of future sums 
of money is less than the value of the same amount today (because people generally 
prefer to consume now rather than later, and because today’s money can be invested 
to generate interest that accumulates into the future). For conventional investment 
decisions, the market interest rate is usually used as the discount rate. The application 
of the usual discount rate of 4-6% means that the value of impacts in the more distant 
future (such as climate change impacts that may occur in the latter half of this century) 
is close to zero. While some do not regard this as a problem (essentially saying that in-
stead of spending on preventing climate change, money should be invested to ensure 
that future generations are as rich as possible), others argue that such ‘discounting of 
the future’ is ethically unacceptable (because of climate change, future generations 
may in fact be poorer than we are today), and a lower discount rate (called the social 
discount rate) should be applied (Weisbach-Sunstein 2008).
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Indeed, many entirely reject the application of a cost-benefit analysis approach 
to the problem, pointing out that vital ecosystem services threatened by cli-
mate change cannot be replaced by money (Neumayer 2007).
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5. INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO ADDRESS CLIMATE 
CHANGE 
Concerns regarding the influence of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions 
on the climate system began to emerge in the middle of the twentieth century. 
Mounting evidence over the following decades led to increasing political at-
tention to the issue that resulted in a series of international conferences and 
treaties that continue to this day. Within this framework, many countries have 
made commitments and introduced a range of measures to address climate 
change: however, as can be seen from the emission trends described in the 
previous chapter, these efforts have hitherto been insufficient to effectively 
tackle the problem.
The two basic categories of measures for addressing climate change are 
called mitigation and adaptation. Mitigation refers to the prevention of warm-
ing mainly by reducing greenhouse gas emissions but also by enhancing 
so-called ‘sinks’ that remove greenhouse gases from the air (such as forests 
that bind CO2). Adaptation, as previously mentioned, means preparing for a 
warmer world via making investments into flood protection, irrigation systems, 
drought-tolerant crops, health care, etc. Although the proportion of effort and 
resources that should be devoted to mitigation and adaptation measures is de-
batable, it is clear that these must be seen as complementary strategies rather 
than mutually exclusive options. Because climate change is no longer com-
pletely avoidable, adaptation is necessary to reduce the damage – but even 
with significant investment, our capacity for adaptation has its limits, mean-
ing that mitigation is also indispensable for stopping the temperature increase 
before it becomes unmanageable (IPCC 2014). In the early stages, the inter-
national climate negotiations focused largely on mitigation, with adaptation 
emerging as an important topic later as it became clear that a certain degree 
of climate change is inevitable.
Effectively mitigating climate change is made difficult by the fact that it 
requires joint efforts by all large emitters of greenhouse gases. In economic 
terms, a stable climate can be understood as a public good. Public goods rep-
resent a form of market failure27 that can be resolved by government interven-
tion (for example by introducing taxes to finance their creation). The climate, 
however, is a global public good with no global governance authority to ensure 
27 The central characteristic of public goods is that they are non-excludable, meaning 
that it is not possible to prevent people who have not paid for them from having 
access to them (typical examples include national defence or street lighting). This 
gives rise to the ‘free-rider’ problem, where individuals can take advantage of these 
goods without contributing to their creation – however, if too many people take this 
approach, the good will not be provided and everyone will suffer a loss of welfare.
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that it is protected. As we will see below, the incentive for individual countries 
to free-ride (wait for others to shoulder the economic cost of emission re-
ductions while not making significant sacrifices themselves) continues to be a 
huge problem. (Weitzman 2017)
5.1. The United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change
The first major step towards addressing climate change at the international 
level was taken at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Devel-
opment (colloquially known as the ‘Earth Summit’ or the ‘Rio Summit’) in 1992: 
the adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC). As a framework convention, this treaty did not contain any specific 
greenhouse gas emission reduction targets; rather, it formulated the general 
objective of ‘stabiliz[ing] greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere 
at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system’ (United Nations 1992, Article 2), and established the mecha-
nisms for negotiating future, more specific treaties to this end. One concrete 
task set out by the Convention is the establishment of national greenhouse 
gas inventories to monitor countries’ emissions (as well as removal by carbon 
sinks), which can also serve as baselines for future emission reduction com-
mitments.
The UNFCCC entered into force after achieving the required number of rati-
fications in 1994 and currently has 197 parties, meaning that the vast major-
ity of countries are involved (Figure 9). The Convention acknowledges that 
developed countries are responsible for the majority of historical greenhouse 
gas emissions28 and that their per capita emissions are also higher than those 
of developing countries. It therefore establishes the principle of ‘common but 
differentiated responsibilities’, meaning that developed countries should take 
the lead in addressing climate change. These developed countries are listed in 
Annex I of the treaty and are therefore known as Annex I countries (they include 
most OECD member countries as well as several former Soviet republics). A 
narrower circle of the world’s most advanced countries (listed in Annex II) are 
also expected to provide financial assistance to support developing countries’ 
mitigation and adaptation efforts (United Nations 1992).
28 Historical emissions are significant because, as explained earlier, a significant por-
tion of such greenhouse gases remain in the atmosphere and influence the climate 
for many years after they are emitted.
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Figure 9 Parties to the UNFCCC 
 
Source: Wikipedia
Each year (starting from 1995) the parties to the UNFCCC meet (usually in 
November or December) to discuss the implementation of the convention and 
make decisions regarding further steps. (These meetings are known as COPs, 
or conferences of the parties.)
5.2. The Kyoto Protocol
The third COP, held in 1997 in Kyoto, saw the adoption of the first (and so far, 
only) treaty under the UNFCCC with concrete, legally binding emission reduc-
tion requirements: the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol entered into force 
in 2005.
5.2.1. Targets
The Kyoto Protocol covers six greenhouse gases: CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs 
and SF6. Changes in carbon sinks (related to land-use change and forestry) 
are also taken into account when calculating the reductions. In line with the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, in this first round of 
commitments only the developed countries of Annex I were required to reduce 
their emissions, on average by around 5% (with a separate target for each 
country), from 1990 to 2008-2012 based on the average emission for those 
years (United Nations 1998).
The EU (then consisting of 15 Member States) had a reduction target of 8% 
(which was internally broken down into different individual targets for each Mem-
ber State). The USA signed the treaty and agreed to a reduction of 7%, but then 
(after a change of government) decided not to ratify it (citing as a reason that, 
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since developing countries were not required to make any reductions, the treaty 
would seriously harm the US economy) (Bush 2001). Japan had a target of 6%, 
Russia 0% (effectively promising not to increase its emissions), and Hungary 
6%. For some Eastern European countries, the base year was not 1990 but 
earlier (for Hungary, it was the average of the years 1985-1987 [United Nations 
1998]). This is a significant fact, because in the early 1990s the collapse of the 
heavy-industry-oriented communist economy in these countries led to huge 
emission reductions, meaning that they were able to meet (and often greatly 
overachieve) their Kyoto targets without any dedicated effort.29
5.2.2. Flexible mechanisms
The Kyoto protocol also established several mechanisms for fostering interna-
tional cooperation to reduce emissions, the so-called Kyoto flexibility mecha-
nisms. The underlying logic is that, since the atmospheric concentration of 
greenhouse gases only depends on the total amount of global emissions, not 
their geographical location, reductions should be made wherever this can be 
done at the lowest possible cost. Countries are therefore allowed to finance 
reductions elsewhere in the world and count these toward their own targets. 
The Protocol establishes three flexibility mechanisms by which this may be 
done: International Emissions Trading (IET), Joint Implementation Projects (JI), 
and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (United Nations 1998).
International Emissions Trading allows Annex I countries which are able to 
exceed their own targets to ‘sell’ the surplus emission reduction to countries 
who are struggling to meet their own goals.30 In practice, it was mainly the 
former communist countries of Eastern Europe which, for the above-mentioned 
reasons, were able sell emission allowances under this system to countries 
such as Japan, Austria, Spain, etc. However, as the reduction of emissions in 
Eastern European countries happened independently of any conscious effort 
and was already apparent by the time the national Kyoto targets were estab-
lished, many criticized the practice, pointing out that allowing other countries 
to use these ‘unnecessary’ emission allowances (often referred to as ‘hot air’) 
was detrimental to the climate goals. To alleviate these concerns, countries 
selling their emission allowances usually pledged to use the resulting income 
29 In Hungary, this phenomenon is known as the ‘environmental bonus effect’ of the 
(economically and socially traumatic) restructuring process that accompanied the 
transition to democracy and market economy (in Hungarian: ‘a rendszerváltozás 
környezeti ajándékhatása’).
30 While following a similar logic, it is important to distinguish this mechanism from 
the permit trading systems described in Chapter 1.2.3, whereby individual pollut-
ers – companies –  trade emission quotas/allowances. Some such systems, such as 
the EU’s Emission Trading System, have links to the flexible Kyoto mechanisms, as 
described later, but are still separate instruments.
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to finance further emission reductions (such as investments into renewable 
energy or energy efficiency) under so-called Green Investment Schemes. Nev-
ertheless, it is probably the criticism of such ‘hot air’ purchases that resulted in 
the IET being, in terms of the quantity of emission credits transferred, the least 
used of the three flexible mechanisms (Grubb et al. 2011).
The other two mechanisms, Joint Implementation Projects and the Clean 
Development Mechanism allow Annex I countries to finance specific emis-
sion reduction projects in other countries and count the reductions they 
achieve toward their own targets. The difference between the two is that in 
the case of the JI, the country where the project is taking place is also an An-
nex I country – the two Annex I countries that are involved finance the project 
together and divide up the resulting emission reduction credits. (For example, 
when the Kazincbarcika power plant in Hungary was converted from coal to bi-
omass in 2002, the Netherlands paid around EUR 3 billion of the EUR 10 billion 
investment cost and received 700,000 emission reduction credits in exchange 
[Népszabadság 2002].) CDM projects, on the other hand, take place in devel-
oping countries and are financed entirely by Annex I countries – through these 
projects, developing countries which have no reduction obligations of their 
own can also become involved in the implementation of the Kyoto protocol. In 
practice, CDM has proven more popular with investors than JI (or the IET), and 
its main beneficiaries have been more advanced developing countries, with 
China being by far the largest recipient, followed by India, Brazil and South 
Korea, with African countries only accounting for 2% of emission reduction 
credits (Shishlov et al. 2016).
Views about these project-based mechanisms, especially the CDM, are 
mixed. On the one hand, they allow Annex I countries to meet their reduc-
tion obligations at a lower cost while encouraging FDI inflows and technology 
transfer toward developing countries. On the other hand, the accounting of 
emission reductions can be problematic. Unlike emission allowances traded 
under the IET, which represent reductions that have already taken place, the 
reductions ‘produced’ by JI and CDM projects can only be estimated against a 
hypothetical baseline and are therefore less certain (Grubb et al. 2011). (Build-
ing a wind or a solar power plant, for example, will not in itself reduce CO2 
emissions, but only if we assume that without this investment from the Annex I 
country the host country would have built a fossil power plant instead.) 
Indeed, the CDM has repeatedly come under fire for financing projects whose 
environmental benefits are doubtful. In the early days of CDM, one of the most 
popular projects was the destruction of industrial gases such as HFC-23. This 
gas is a by-product of refrigerant production and a potent greenhouse gas, 
so destroying it instead of releasing it into the environment is clearly benefi-
cial. However, demand for the resulting emission reduction credits by Western 
investors made HFC-23 destruction so lucrative that in some cases the gas 
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was manufactured solely in order to be destroyed in the framework of CDM 
projects. Upon realizing this problem, the rules were changed so that new 
facilities would not be eligible for CDM. Over time, renewable energy projects 
became the most important ones under the CDM, but ensuring additionality 
is also a challenge with these. Hydropower plants, for example, generally pro-
duce energy at a low cost, so it is likely that host countries would have built 
these anyway, without CDM assistance. And since the construction of large 
hydropower plants is usually accompanied by huge ecological damage, their 
overall environmental benefit is questionable. (Even investments in fossil fuels 
are not excluded from the CDM if it can be shown that they are ‘cleaner’ than 
the average coal power plant.) In order to ensure an added environmental ben-
efit, CDM projects are subject to a complex approval and monitoring process 
which, while creating legitimacy, also causes delays and greatly increases the 
associated transaction costs. Nevertheless, it should be acknowledged that 
CDM projects have played an important role in laying the foundations for the 
renewable energy industry in countries such as China which is now one of the 
World’s leading investors in the field (Grubb et al. 2011). 
5.2.3. Compliance and results
Although the UNFCCC states that the compliance mechanism of the Kyoto 
protocol ‘is among the most comprehensive and rigorous systems of compli-
ance for a multilateral environmental agreement’, the consequences for coun-
tries that fail to meet their emission reduction targets are in fact quite limited. 
The main ‘punishment’ for non-compliance is that Annex I countries that do 
not meet their reduction targets can be required to reduce their emissions by 
an additional 30% during the next phase (the so-called second commitment 
period) of the Protocol. Countries can also be suspended from participating in 
the flexible mechanisms (UNFCCC 2019a). It is, however, highly questionable 
whether any country which failed to reach their target in the first period would 
have any motivation to participate and meet the more stringent target in the 
second period.
Despite the lack of a strong enforcement mechanism, all Annex I countries 
were able to achieve full compliance with their targets for the first commitment 
period 2008-2012. The single exception is Canada, which had a reduction tar-
get of 6% but instead saw its emissions rise by over 33% and decided to 
formally withdraw from the Protocol in 2011 rather than find itself in a situation 
of non-compliance. (The provisions of the Protocol allow withdrawals even at 
such a late stage.) All the remaining countries successfully met their targets, 
although some were only able to do so with the help of the flexible mecha-
nisms – these are the countries shown in red in Figure 10, which illustrates the 
domestic emissions of countries relative to their Kyoto targets. 
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Figure 10 Relative difference between the average annual domestic emissions of countries for 
2008–2012 and their respective Kyoto targets
 
Source: Shishlov et al. 2016, p. 4.
The aggregate emission reduction in Annex I countries was 24%, much 
greater than the required 4% (the overall reduction requirement was reduced 
from the previously mentioned 5% due to non-ratification by the USA and the 
withdrawal of Canada). This ‘overachievement’ can be attributed to several 
factors – notably, the results of the economic transition in the ex-communist 
countries (which, as previously mentioned, were already known at the time 
that the Protocol was signed, but it was expected that the USA and Canada 
would buy up most of the surplus credits.) However, according to estimates by 
Shishlov et al. (2016), the overall Kyoto target would have been achieved even 
without these ‘hot air’ credits. Another factor contributing to the overachieve-
ment was the economic crisis of 2008-2009 which led to a (temporary) reduc-
tion in global energy consumption and GHG emissions. Last but not least, it 
should be acknowledged that during the period in question, many Annex I 
countries made substantial efforts to reduce GHG emissions by introducing a 
range of policy measures such as energy taxes, emissions trading schemes, 
and support schemes for renewable energy and energy efficiency investment. 
Despite the fact that its formal targets were exceeded, the Kyoto protocol 
fell far short of achieving the UNFCCC’s goal of preventing dangerous climate 
change. This is mainly due to the limited coverage of the agreement: as de-
veloping countries had no reduction targets and the USA and Canada also 
exited, the Protocol in fact covered only around a quarter of the World’s total 
GHG emissions.
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5.3. Efforts in the post-Kyoto period
As it was clear that the Kyoto protocol only represented a first step towards ad-
dressing climate change, the international community started discussions about 
a new agreement for the post-Kyoto period in 2007, with the objective of adopt-
ing a new, binding treaty by 2009 (United Nations 2008). The most important 
change compared to previous negotiations was the realisation that in order to 
achieve meaningful results, it would be necessary for developing countries to 
also commit to limiting their greenhouse gas emissions. (While the per capita 
GHG emissions of developing countries continue to be much lower than in the 
developed world, their absolute emissions have increased rapidly and now ac-
count for a larger share of global emissions – see Figure 11.) However, this has 
made reaching an agreement that is acceptable to all sides considerably more 
difficult. The greater involvement of developing countries also drew more at-
tention to issues that are important from their perspective. One is the question 
of the financial assistance that developing countries view as a prerequisite for 
agreeing to cut their emissions. The other is the increase in efforts to reduce 
deforestation, which compared to in developed countries plays a much greater 
role in the emissions of the developing world (Ekholm-Lindroos 2015). 
Figure 11 Evolution of GHG emissions by country/region
 
Source: Olivier-Peters 2018, p. 20.
Adopting a new treaty was the main goal of the Copenhagen Climate Con-
ference (COP 15 of the UNFCCC) in December 2009. Expectations were high 
(not least because the new US administration under Barack Obama promised 
to take a constructive stance) and the summit was accompanied by consider-
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able attention from NGOs and the media. The negotiations, however, failed to 
deliver a new treaty and instead resulted in the non-binding Copenhagen Ac-
cord (reflecting the position of the USA and the BASIC countries – Brazil, South 
Africa, India and China). The Accord states for the first time the goal of limiting 
the global average temperature increase to 2°C but does not contain any spe-
cific national targets to this end. Instead, countries were asked to individually 
adopt and announce their own targets (for the year 2020) in the period follow-
ing the conference, which was done by 85 countries (United Nations 2010). 
In line with the expectations formulated in the text of the Accord, developed 
countries submitted actual reduction targets (some of which were conditional 
upon other countries also taking meaningful action), while developing coun-
tries instead made pledges to reduce the carbon intensity of their economies 
or to reduce emissions compared to a business-as-usual scenario – effectively 
meaning that these countries only pledged to slow down the growth of their 
carbon emissions rather than to actually reduce them (UNFCCC 2010). An 
analysis by the UNEP of these national pledges indicated that they were over-
all insufficient to limit global warming to 2°C (UNEP 2010).
The Copenhagen Accord also contains a pledge to substantially increase 
financial assistance from developed countries to help developing countries 
with their mitigation and adaptation efforts. (Several multilateral funds were 
already in existence to serve this purpose under World Bank or UN auspices 
– the Green Climate Fund established by the Copenhagen Accord has since 
become the largest such fund.) The goal set out by the Accord is to reach USD 
100bn/year by 2020 (United Nations 2010), but so far the actual funding has 
fallen far short of this promise (Climate Policy Initiative 2018).
Stepping up efforts in the field of forestry was also on the agenda of the 
post-Kyoto negotiations. Afforestation/reforestation measures (planting new 
forests) were already eligible as CDM projects in the Kyoto framework, but 
efforts to prevent deforestation (the protection of existing forests), although 
potentially much more important, could not be counted due to methodologi-
cal difficulties. (One such difficulty is the aforementioned additionality issue 
– how can we be certain that without implementing the measures in ques-
tion a forest would be destroyed? Another problem specific to deforestation 
is the question of ‘leakage’ – this happens when the protection of forests in 
one area leads to deforestation in another.) However, since the issue is too 
important to be ignored (the 2014 IPCC report estimates that around 10-15% 
of global annual GHG emissions are from land-use change), a new UNFCCC 
initiative was launched to develop methods for the reliable measurement, re-
porting and verification of forest-management-related action and its results. 
The programme, called REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Forest Degradation in Developing Countries) was first conceived in 2005, but it 
was not until 2015 that all the details of implementation were finalised. Under 
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REDD+, participating countries (mostly tropical countries) are required to de-
velop strategies and action plans to protect and manage their forests, and to 
develop specific projects with measurable emission savings, for which activity 
they will receive international funding (United Nations 2016).
As it became clear that attempts to negotiate a new treaty for the post-Kyoto pe-
riod would not succeed in time, some parties to the Protocol decided to fill the gap 
by extending the Kyoto Protocol (due to expire in 2012) until 2020. The extension, 
known as the Doha Amendment, was adopted in December 2012 and contains 
new reduction commitments by Annex I parties but still no such commitments for 
developing countries (the extension is known as the second commitment period 
of the Protocol) (United Nations 2012). However, from the original Annex I parties 
to the Protocol, Japan, Russia and New Zealand decided not to participate in the 
extension, thus the only participants with reduction targets are the EU, Australia, 
and Kazakhstan, representing only around 15% of global GHG emissions. (As of 
March 2019, the amendment is still not in force due to the insufficient number of 
ratifications, but the EU has already achieved its promised reduction of 20%.) 
5.4. The Paris Agreement
The continuing series of negotiations in the framework of the UNFCCC finally re-
sulted in the adoption of a new climate treaty at the 21st COP in Paris in December 
2015. The Paris agreement was signed by 194 countries and entered into force in 
October 2016. (The United States signed and ratified the treaty, but later the Trump 
administration announced its intention to withdraw from it as soon as possible.31)
The central aim of the Paris Agreement is stated as ‘holding the increase in 
the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and 
pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C’ (United Nations 2015, 
Article 2). However, unlike the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement does not con-
tain any actual emission reduction targets for participating countries. Instead, it 
requires them to set and submit their own targets (called ‘nationally determined 
contributions’, or NDCs), essentially extending the approach taken by the Copen-
hagen Accord. These targets should be revised every five years, with each new 
target more ambitious than the previous one. The targets are not legally binding 
and there is no enforcement mechanism to ensure that they are met. However, the 
treaty does contain legally binding requirements for parties to regularly report on 
the evolution of their greenhouse gas emissions and their mitigation activities, the 
idea being that a system of ‘naming and shaming’ underperforming countries will 
motivate them to step up their efforts (Roberts-Arellano 2017).
31 The provisions of the treaty allow countries to formally announce their withdrawal no 
earlier than three years after ratification, which in the case of the USA is in November 
2019, with the withdrawal becoming effective one year later.
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Further issues addressed by the Paris Agreement include climate finance 
(re-affirming the intention to provide USD 100bn/year to help developing coun-
tries), an increased focus on adaptation measures, as well as provisions re-
garding international cooperation for achieving emission reductions (essential-
ly a continuation of the Kyoto flexible mechanisms). On this last issue, the Paris 
Agreement establishes a framework for the ‘international transfer of mitigation 
outcomes’ (ITMO), similar to the IET mechanism in the Kyoto protocol, and a 
Sustainable Development Mechanism, similar to CDM. However, the specifics 
regarding the functioning of these mechanisms were not laid out, and some 
countries (such as those within the EU) have indicated that they plan to reach 
their emission reduction targets domestically, without recourse to the former.
Indeed, many important details regarding the implementation of the Paris 
Agreement were left to be clarified by subsequent meetings. Key rules regard-
ing the measurement and reporting of countries’ emissions and mitigation ef-
forts were adopted at the 24th COP in Katowice in December 2018, but some 
other questions (such as the rules governing the international cooperation 
mechanisms) remain unsettled.
After the adoption of the Paris Agreement, many expressed disappointment 
about the lack of legally binding targets in the treaty (Clémençon 2016). How-
ever, the absence of legally binding targets may not be as crucial to the suc-
cess of the treaty as it initially seems. Since participation in any international 
treaty is voluntary, binding targets and strong enforcement provisions may 
actually be counter-productive in that they reduce countries’ willingness to 
join an agreement (or countries may decide to join but only take on very weak 
targets that are unlikely to cause compliance problems). Legally binding agree-
ments are therefore not necessarily more effective in terms of achieving their 
purpose – what ultimately matters is whether there is sufficient motivation for 
countries to join and subsequently implement the provisions of any interna-
tional agreement, and this motivation is often of a political nature (international 
pressure, trading favours, public opinion, etc.)(Chang 2010). 
In the case of the Paris Agreement, it is largely the flexible approach regard-
ing national targets that made it possible to get so many countries on board 
(Clémençon 2016). This flexibility may also be beneficial because the regular 
review of the NDCs allows targets to be progressively strengthened.32 Moreo-
32 The rapid transformation of the Chinese economy, for example, may well lead to the 
country significantly overachieving its current targets – if the mechanisms for the 
international trading of emission credits continue in the Paris era, this could lead to a 
huge surplus of credits in the system (similar to the issues surrounding ‘hot air’ from 
ex-communist countries under the Kyoto regime). However, unlike the Kyoto regime 
wherein national targets were fixed at the outset, under the Paris framework China’s 
target may be modified upward in its next NDC to reflect changing conditions and 
avert this problem (Grubb 2016).
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ver, the strong transparency requirements create a good basis for countries to 
hold each other accountable for their contributions. Ultimately, the success of 
the Agreement depends on countries’ readiness to apply political pressure on 
each other to make sure that all live up to their responsibility for protecting the 
climate (Herz 2017). It must be noted, however, that the current targets (the 
first round of NDCs) submitted by the parties are overall insufficient to achieve 
the goal of limiting the global temperature increase to 1.5-2°C (UNEP 2018), as 
is discussed in detail below.
A comprehensive review of the implementation and progress under the Paris 
Agreement is foreseen for 2023.
5.5. Current situation and questions for the future
Although much progress has been made towards addressing climate change 
since the world gradually became aware of the threat in the final decades of 
the twentieth century, assessments show that current efforts are still falling 
behind what is needed to effectively tackle the problem. Indeed, instead of 
closing, the so-called ‘science-policy gap’ regarding the climate issue has 
widened considerably in recent years, with policy makers failing to act upon 
the recommendations of the scientific community who are calling for much 
faster and steeper emission cuts in light of improving knowledge about the 
process and impacts of climate change. (Faragó 2016)
Each year (since the approach of countries adopting their own targets was 
adopted as a result of the Copenhagen conference), the UNEP publishes an 
assessment analysing these commitments and comparing them to what is 
needed to stay within the 1.5 and 2°C temperature limits (the so-called ‘emis-
sions gap report’). According to the latest such report (UNEP 2018), imple-
menting all current NDCs for 2030 would put the world on the path to an ap-
proximately 3-3.2°C temperature increase compared to pre-industrial levels by 
the end of the twenty-first century (with warming expected to continue further 
beyond 2100). Staying within the 2°C limit would require countries to approxi-
mately triple their proposed reductions and staying within the 1.5°C limit would 
require a fivefold increase. The report also notes that the majority of countries 
are not yet on track to reach their 2030 targets and need to adopt additional 
policy measures to do so. 
Indeed, global GHG emissions have increased again in 2017 after three years 
of stagnation and are not expected to peak before 2030 based on current tar-
gets and policies (although an increasing number of countries have already 
passed their peak and are now seeing absolute emission reductions). Howev-
er, the 2018 emissions gap report acknowledges that significant changes have 
started to occur worldwide in areas such as renewable energy investment, 
electric mobility, energy efficiency, etc. and the world is finally moving away 
60 ANNA SZÉCHY: ENVIRONMENTAL AND CLIMATE POLICY
from its dependence on fossil fuels – the main problem is that these changes 
are not happening nearly as fast as necessary. The pace of change is of course 
limited by existing infrastructure (including everything from coal power plants 
and gas pipelines to diesel cars and poorly insulated buildings), and delaying 
action can make this ‘carbon lock-in’ effect worse33 (UNEP 2018).
5.5.1. An evaluation of countries’ efforts
The current NDCs of the top 10 GHG-emitting countries for 2030 are as follows 
(UNFCCC 2019b):
•	 Brazil:	43%	reduction	since	2005
•	 Canada:	30%	reduction	since	2005
•	 EU:	40%	domestic	emission	reduction	since	1990
•	 China:	60-65%	reduction	of	emissions	per	unit	of	GDP	since	2005,	with	
a peak in absolute emissions expected by 2030 at the latest
•	 India:	33-35%	reduction	of	emissions	per	unit	of	GDP	since	2005
•	 Indonesia:	29-41%	below	business-as-usual	emissions	
•	 Japan:	26%	reduction	since	2013
•	 Mexico:	25%-40%	below	business-as-usual	emissions,	with	a	peak	in	
absolute emissions expected around 2025-26
•	 Russia	(has	not	yet	ratified	the	treaty):	25-30%	reduction	since	1990
•	 USA	(intends	to	withdraw	from	the	treaty):	26-28%	reduction	from	2005	
- 2025 (expected) 
As the list shows, with countries taking their own approach to target setting, 
comparison of targets has become quite difficult. First, countries are using differ-
ent baselines: as most countries (with the notable exception of Russia) increased 
their GHG emissions from 1990 to 2005, a 2005 baseline implies a smaller re-
duction than a 1990 baseline (Canada’s 30% emission reduction target from 
2005, for example, is equivalent to a 15% reduction from 1990 levels). Second, a 
major difference between developed and developing countries’ commitments is 
still that developing countries are usually only prepared to pledge a reduction rel-
ative to their GDP, which means that their absolute emissions continue to grow 
– although some developing countries, such as China, have indicated the point 
at which they intend to start making absolute reductions. Some countries have 
conditional targets (the higher numbers in the case of Indonesia and Mexico, 
for example), which they are ready to implement only under certain conditions 
33 If the world decides to shift to a low-carbon economy, existing fossil fuel reserves 
and infrastructure will need to be written off as ‘stranded assets’ (coal power plants 
will need to be shut down before they reach the end of their technical lifetime, oil 
reserves left in the ground, etc.), causing significant economic losses. The more we 
continue to invest in such infrastructure, the greater the potential loss and the more 
difficult it becomes to commit to making a change (UNEP 2018).
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(which are usually quite vague, such as that other countries should also take 
ambitious action or that developing countries receive financial support). Last but 
not least, countries’ commitments also vary regarding the inclusion of land use 
and forestry emissions. As previously mentioned, these may be very important in 
some countries, but because their estimation is highly uncertain, their inclusion 
makes it more difficult to evaluate a country’s progress. (A positive approach is 
therefore taken by some countries, for example, India, which set itself a forestry 
target not as a part of but in addition to its overall emission reduction target.)
Figure 12 shows an assessment of countries’ current commitments published 
by an association of three independent research institutes (Climate Action Track-
er 2019). Colours indicate whether the level of ambition reflected in each coun-
try’s target is in line with the Paris temperature goals, taking into account the 
individual situation of each country. While opinions may differ as to what exactly 
can be considered the ‘fair share’ that countries in different positions should 
contribute to the fight against climate change (the assessment in Figure 12 com-
bines various approaches to determine this), it is clear (as is acknowledged by 
the principles of the UNFCCC) that more can be expected of prosperous nations 
than developing countries. (This is why, for example, India’s target is rated fa-
vourably by the assessment, even though in absolute terms it is much lower than 
the pledges of many other countries such as the EU or Canada.)
Figure 12 Evaluation of current climate pledges according to Climate Action Tracker
Source: Climate Action Tracker 2019
When it comes to evaluating countries’ GHG emissions and reductions, all in-
ternational treaties currently adopt the principle that each country is responsible 
for the emissions originating from within its own national borders. However, given 
the fact that today’s globalised economy is characterized by high volumes of inter-
national trade, this may not be the best approach for accounting for GHG emis-
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sions. It is questionable whether, for example, CO2 emissions associated with the 
production of a smartphone (or any other product) made in China but sold and used 
in Europe or the USA should indeed be considered part of China’s emissions rather 
than those of the importing countries whose consumer demand was the reason for 
producing the product. Some suggest that the current production-based account-
ing of emissions should be replaced by a consumption-based system whereby 
a country’s emissions are calculated by subtracting exports and adding imports 
to domestic emissions. This would make a huge difference for many countries, 
reducing the emissions of big exporters such as China (whose emissions would be 
more than 20% lower under a consumption-based system) and generally attribut-
ing more to OECD nations (see Figure 13) (Davis – Caldeira 2010). A consumption-
based system is generally regarded as being more favourable to the attainment 
of climate goals since developed countries usually have more ambitious climate 
targets which would then cover a larger proportion of global emissions – and they 
could no longer achieve reductions by ‘outsourcing’ polluting production activities 
to developing nations. The problem is that calculating consumption-based emis-
sions is far more complex and involves more uncertainty than a production-based 
system and is therefore unlikely to replace the current production-based system in 
the foreseeable future34 (Csutora – Vetőné Mózner 2013, Alfionis et al. 2017).
Figure 13 Largest flows of carbon emissions embedded in international trade
 
Source: Davis-Caldeira 2010
34 The fairest approach would probably be to somehow divide the responsibility for 
emissions embedded in international trade between consumer and producer coun-
tries because they both enjoy the benefits of these activities (consumer countries 
benefit from the use of products, while producers benefit in the form of income and 
jobs). Various principles have been put forward to create such GHG accounting sys-
tems based on ‘shared-responsibility’ but none are developed enough to represent 
a realistic alternative (Csutora – Vetőné Mózner 2013, Alfionis et al. 2017).
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5.5.2. Alternative approaches
Given the insufficiency of current policy measures and targets for tackling the prob-
lem of climate change, there is a lot of discussion about how to step up efforts and 
what, if any, complementary or alternative approaches could be more successful.
One such alternative is the suggestion that instead of focusing on setting fixed 
reduction targets, the de-carbonisation of the economy could be promoted more 
effectively by setting a global price for carbon emissions. Making polluters pay 
the cost of the pollution they cause is the fundamental principle of environmental 
economics and has huge potential to motivate emission reductions. The pricing 
could be done in the form of a tax or an emissions trading system – indeed, many 
countries already have such systems in place, but out of concern for international 
competitiveness, they are reluctant to impose prices that are high enough to have 
the necessary impact. Therefore, several prominent economists advocate the idea 
that countries should commit as a group to a globally harmonised (minimum) car-
bon price, something that they believe would be easier to negotiate than quantita-
tive reduction targets (Weitzman 2015, Nordhaus 2013, Stiglitz 2015).
So far, this approach has not yet appeared at the international climate negotia-
tions (in the Paris framework, carbon pricing is viewed simply as one possible tool 
for helping meet national targets), so countries continue on their own path, but the 
number and scope of carbon pricing schemes around the world is growing contin-
uously. As of February 2019, according to the World Bank around 44 countries as 
well as 27 sub-national actors (cities, states or regions) have implemented carbon 
pricing schemes, covering just under 14% of global greenhouse gas emissions 
(World Bank 2019; see Figure 14), with several more planning to do so in the near 
future. Notably, following several successful regional pilots, China is currently in 
the process of setting up a nationwide emissions trading scheme (initially covering 
only the power sector). (It should be noted that in addition to the ones shown in 
Figure 14, most other countries also have energy or fuel taxes in some form, but 
they are not based explicitly on the carbon content of fuels.)  
The problem is that carbon prices under most of these schemes – although 
increasing – still fall far short of what is necessary. The World Bank estimates that 
by 2020 a price of 40-80 USD/tonne would be needed to meet the Paris targets 
(World Bank – Ecofys 2018), while the OECD uses a similar but slightly lower range 
of 30-60 EUR/t35 – but states in its 2018 report that actual carbon prices across all 
industries in OECD countries (taking into account all forms of fossil fuel taxes) are 
overall 76.5% lower than the low benchmark of 30 EUR/t (OECD 2018).
35 The values used by the OECD are based on calculations regarding the climate-
change-related costs associated with the emission of each additional tonne of CO2. 
While this approach (calculating the size of the externality that needs to be internal-
ised) can be considered theoretically superior (because of the previously discussed 
huge uncertainty inherent in estimating future damage from climate change), it is 
also less reliable than the World Bank’s method of estimating the ideal carbon price 
based on the reductions required to achieve the Paris targets.
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Figure 14 Summary map of national, sub-national and regional carbon pricing initiatives
 
Source: World Bank 2019
With global emission trends continuing in an unfavourable direction, ef-
forts are also continuing to find new technological solutions to the climate 
problem. Collectively known as climate engineering or geoengineering, these 
techniques aim at deliberately altering the Earth’s climate system and fall into 
two broad categories: carbon dioxide removal (CDR), which seeks to reduce 
greenhouse gas concentrations by creating additional carbon sinks, and solar 
radiation management (SRM), which aims to limit global warming by reducing 
the amount of solar radiation that the Earth absorbs (IPCC 2014). Potential 
CDR techniques (in addition to simple afforestation) include bioenergy with 
carbon capture and storage (using plants to absorb CO2 from the atmosphere 
and then storing it in geological formations underground when the plants are 
burned to create energy),36 biochar (which also relies on plants to absorb CO2, 
but these are then converted to charcoal and spread onto the soil, improving 
its quality and creating long-term storage for the carbon), as well as various 
technologies for the direct air capture of CO2. Several options have also been 
proposed for SRM, such as injecting aerosols into the stratosphere, spray-
ing seawater to brighten marine clouds, and even launching giant mirrors into 
space, all of which would produce a cooling effect by increasing the share of 
solar radiation that is reflected from the Earth.
36 Carbon capture and storage technology can of course also be used with fossil fuel 
power plants to prevent CO2 emissions into the atmosphere, but if used in conjunc-
tion with biomass it can potentially result in the net removal of the gas.
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Most of these techniques are currently in the early stages of development 
and have several problems such as cost (which are generally high for CDR, but 
can be very low in the case of some SRM solutions) and a range of potentially 
unfavourable side effects (the sustainability of  solutions involving biomass is 
always questionable because of land-use change impacts, while large-scale 
interference with the climate system called for by SRM techniques is inherently 
very risky [IPCC 2014]). According to critics, the greatest problem is that exper-
imentation with these technologies can be used as an excuse to delay reduc-
ing greenhouse gas emissions (Hamilton 2015). Nevertheless, most scenarios 
developed by the IPCC assume that CDR techniques (notably bioenergy with 
carbon capture and storage) will be used, complementary to other mitigation 
options (mainly in the second half of the century), because this represents the 
only way to sufficiently reduce atmospheric GHG concentrations (IPCC 2014). 
5.5.3. The role of private actors
Beyond policymakers, other actors such as businesses and individuals can 
also contribute to the fight against climate change and, seeing the inadequacy 
of policy efforts, some even believe that the voluntary actions of such private 
actors might be the solution. While this book largely focuses on public policy, 
we consider it worthwhile to briefly outline the role of these other actors to see 
whether such high expectations are justified. 
Regarding businesses, it has already been discussed in Chapter 2.3.2 that 
an increasing number of the former have environmental programmes that go 
beyond legal requirements, and in recent years climate change and green-
house gas emissions have clearly emerged as a top priority with regard to 
these efforts (BSR – Globescan 2018). The drive to reduce operating costs 
has always pushed companies to strive to increase the efficiency of the use of 
resources such as energy, but today many companies are going further by us-
ing a rapidly developing range of tools to address their contribution to climate 
change and the associated risks. A recent survey of the world’s 1200 largest 
companies showed that nearly 80% have programs in place to reduce GHG 
emissions, and around half also have a concrete, quantified GHG reduction 
target. Another new trend is that, instead of setting these targets arbitrarily, 
leading firms are now relying on complex methodologies to derive their indi-
vidual emission reduction targets from the global 2°C or 1.5°C climate goals. 
If companies are to effectively address their contribution to climate change, 
it is also essential to look beyond their organisational boundaries as a huge 
share of GHG emissions related to their activities occur elsewhere in the sup-
ply chain, from the abstraction of raw materials through transport and manu-
facturing to product use and disposal. Many companies have now completed 
the huge task of calculating these emissions (an exercise known as carbon 
accounting) and are seeking to reduce them via various measures such as se-
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lecting and influencing their suppliers and improving product design. Interest-
ingly, when evaluating investment decisions or the performance of divisions, 
many large multinationals are now applying an internal carbon price (treating 
GHG emissions as if they represented an actual cost). These internal prices 
(averaging 38 USD in 2017) are typically higher than the existing carbon taxes 
or quota-related prices for carbon described in the previous chapter, showing 
that these businesses are expecting to face more stringent climate policies in 
the foreseeable future (Greenbiz – Trucost 2019).
Thanks to such ambitious measures, GHG emissions from the world’s larg-
est companies are now in decline (a 9% reduction from 2013 to 2017 for the 
largest 1200 firms, including supply chain emissions). On the one hand this is 
promising because it shows that even such profit and growth- oriented entities 
as multinational companies are able to make not only efficiency improvements 
but also absolute reductions in their carbon emissions. On the other hand, 
these reductions are still critically insufficient – the targets of the 1200 largest 
companies only amount to around a quarter of the reductions that would be 
needed from them to be compatible with the Paris goals (Greenbiz – Trucost 
2019). And, more importantly, the impressive toolbox described above is only 
used by a select group of the world’s largest companies, while the vast major-
ity of firms are far less conscious in the management of their carbon emissions, 
and small companies often struggle to identify and make even those tech-
nological improvements that would create clear economic as well as climate 
benefits (Dobes et al. 2017). This is why the corporate sector as a whole has so 
far not been able to reduce its emissions (which grew by 1% globally in 2017) 
(Greenbiz – Trucost 2019).
Some believe that instead of relying on policymakers or companies to make 
the necessary changes, it is individuals who will need to embrace more sus-
tainable lifestyles, and are hopeful that such lifestyles will become mainstream 
in the near future. Indeed, studies from around the world show that the major-
ity of people are concerned about environmental problems such as climate 
change (Pew Research Center 2019) and believe that environmental protec-
tion is an important issue. According to the latest Eurobarometer survey of the 
topic, 94% of EU citizens say that protecting the environment is important to 
them personally, with climate change considered the most important prob-
lem (Eurobarometer 2017). Such positive attitudes toward the environment 
are, however, not always reflected in actual behaviour – many studies have 
highlighted this discrepancy and identified a number of potential causes, in-
cluding unwillingness to make sacrifices, a lack of available options, a lack of 
knowledge, as well as established habits and social norms (Zsóka et al. 2013). 
Even so, a growing proportion of people in developed nations are actively try-
ing to pursue a more sustainable lifestyle in a way that is influencing their daily 
consumption-related decisions. (A study from the USA now puts the share of 
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the most environmentally committed consumers at 23% [Natural Marketing 
Institute 2019], and recent market research from Germany also shows that 
the market share of green products across all product categories is growing 
rapidly [Umweltbundesamt 2017].)
The problem is that the changes that such environmentally conscious indi-
viduals are making are not necessarily profound enough to achieve meaningful 
reductions in their environmental impact. A surprising study by Csutora (2012) 
found no significant difference between the average ecological footprint of con-
sumers who engage in pro-environmental behaviour and those who do not. The 
proposed explanation for this counter-intuitive result is that most green con-
sumers practice ‘marginal’ forms of environmentally friendly behaviour (such as 
separating waste, which requires relatively little sacrifice but is also much less 
effective at reducing the individual ecological footprint than, for example, turn-
ing down the thermostat at home or reducing meat consumption). Furthermore, 
people are also limited in their decisions by structural factors (in many places, 
environmentally conscious individuals also have to rely on fossil fuels for heat-
ing and electricity in the absence of renewable energy options, or might need 
to travel by car if the public transport network is inadequate) (Csutora 2012). 
Similarly, the previously mentioned German study also found that, despite the 
increasing market share of green products, the CO2 emissions associated with 
private consumption in Germany have not declined in recent years. The expla-
nation in this case is that green products are least available in those categories 
where the benefits would be the greatest (such as passive houses or electric 
cars), and that the benefits of environmentally friendly products have been offset 
by an increase in the overall quantity of consumption (Umweltbundesamt 2017).
Based on the above considerations, we conclude that while businesses and in-
dividuals can indeed play an important role in achieving environmental goals, this 
can never substitute for policy action which continues to be indispensable both 
for creating an incentive for private actors to make more sustainable decisions, as 
well as shaping the infrastructure around which those decisions are made.
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6. CLIMATE POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
In absolute terms, the climate targets of the EU are among the most ambitious 
in the world. The climate and energy package adopted as a part of the ‘EU 
2020’ strategy (European Commission 2010) has three main targets:
•	 to	reduce	greenhouse	gas	emissions	by	20%	(from	1990	levels)37
•	 to	reach	a	20%	share	of	renewable	sources	in	final	energy	consumption	
(with a sub-target of 10% renewable energy use in the transport sector)
•	 to	improve	energy	efficiency	by	20%38
The targets for 2030 are as follows (they will be reviewed with the possibil-
ity for upward revision in 2023) (European Commission 2019a):
•	 to	reduce	greenhouse	gas	emissions	by	40%	(from	1990	levels)
•	 to	reach	a	32%	share	of	renewable	sources	in	final	energy	consumption	
(with a sub-target of 14% renewable energy use in the transport sector)
•	 to	improve	energy	efficiency	by	32.5%39
The European Commission has also developed a long-term vision for the EU: 
for it to become fully climate neutral by 2050 (via the nearly complete phase-
out of fossil fuels and tackling the remaining emissions via carbon capture and 
storage and enhanced sinks) (European Commission 2018a). (As of May 2019, 
this target is not binding as it has so far not been endorsed by the Council due 
to opposition from Germany and several CEE nations) (Simon 2019).
Progress towards the EU’s 2020 and 2030 climate and energy targets is shown 
in Figure 15 below. It can be seen that the 20% GHG reduction target for 2020 
was met ahead of time and looks to be tenable despite the fact that the Union’s 
emissions have slightly increased in the last few years. There is more uncertainty 
regarding the other two targets, with current trends concerning energy efficiency 
being especially unfavourable. The recent increase in overall energy consump-
tion also makes it more difficult to achieve the renewable energy target, since the 
latter is defined as a percentage of energy consumption, meaning that, in abso-
37 The target does not include emissions from land use change but does cover GHGs 
from international aviation. The EU also formally stated its willingness to increase 
this target to 30% provided that a global agreement could be reached in which ‘other 
developed countries commit themselves to comparable emission reductions and 
that developing countries contribute adequately according to their responsibilities 
and respective capabilities’ (European Commission 2010 p. 11.), but as we have 
seen earlier, these conditions were not met.
38 The exact requirement is that primary energy use should be 20% lower than the busi-
ness-as-usual levels projected for 2020 and is thus defined as an absolute amount 
(equivalent to a net reduction of primary energy consumption of 13.4% from 2005).
39 The target is again defined in a similar way as for 2020 and is equivalent to an abso-
lute reduction of 26% from 2005 levels.
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lute terms, more renewable energy is needed to reach 20% of final consumption.
Figure 15 also shows that the targets for 2030 are quite challenging and 
achieving them will require additional policy measures. The targets are of 
course connected, with progress on renewable energy and energy efficiency 
essential for meeting the overall GHG target. The Commission’s calculations 
show that if the renewables- and energy efficiency targets for 2030 are met, 
this will mean a decrease of at least 45% in GHG emissions, overachieving the 
40% reduction target (European Commission 2018b).
Figure 15 EU progress towards 2020 and 2030 targets for climate and energy
 
Source: based on EEA (2018)
Behind the overall decrease in the Union’s greenhouse gas emissions, huge 
differences can be observed between various sectors (see Figure 16). Compared 
to the base year 1990, the power sector and industry were most successful in 
reducing their emissions, but most other sectors (such as agriculture and house-
holds) were also able to improve their performance. The notable exception is the 
transport sector, which emits nearly 30% more GHGs today than it did in 1990 
and is now responsible for around a quarter of the EU’s emissions (Figure 17).40
40 The largest category, fuel combustion, includes the burning of fossil fuels in power 
plants, industrial installations as well as households.
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The following sections will present an overview of the EU’s most important 
policy measures for achieving its climate and energy targets. 
Figure 16 Evolution of EU greenhouse gas emissions by sector, 1990-2016.
Source: EUROSTAT 2018
Figure 17 Breakdown of EU GHG Emissions by sector in 2016 
Source: EUROSTAT 2018 
 ENVIRONMENTAL AND CLIMATE POLICY  75
6.1. The EU Emissions Trading System (ETS)
The EU’s main policy tool for motivating GHG emission reductions at large 
emitters is the Emissions Trading System (ETS) introduced in 2005. This was 
the world’s first major carbon market and remains by far the largest until this 
day. As discussed in Chapter 2.2.3, emissions trading is an attractive policy 
option because it allows authorities to set fixed reduction targets while main-
taining the flexibility for individual polluters to decide on their own emission re-
duction, thereby minimising total reduction costs. Greenhouse gases like CO2 
represent an ideal application for cap and trade systems, because they do not 
cause direct environmental damage at the local level, which renders the geo-
graphical distribution of emissions and their reduction unimportant. However, 
the devil lies in the details, and as we will see below, in practice it is not easy 
to design a well-functioning emissions trading system.
The EU ETS covers over 11000 large installations that are responsible for 
around 45% of the Union’s GHG emissions. These include power plants, energy 
intensive industries (such as oil refineries, the production of metals, cement, 
ceramics, pulp and paper, certain chemicals, etc.) and airlines (from 2012 on-
wards). The goal is for ETS sectors to reduce their emissions from 2005 levels 
by 21% until 2020, and 43% until 2030. The most important questions surround-
ing the operation of the ETS relate to the determination of the total amount of 
permits – called emission allowances under the ETS – to be issued and deciding 
how to distribute these to participating companies (for free or by auction). The 
ETS operates in phases (also known as trading periods) spanning several years, 
with the rules regarding these and other issues adjusted between each phase 
based on previous experience (European Commission 2016).
The first phase (2005-2007) was essentially a pilot period intended to set 
up and test the system. During this phase, individual Member States were re-
sponsible for deciding the number of emission allowances to be issued, which 
were mostly distributed for free to companies based on their previous emissions 
(‘grandfathering’).41 While the pilot phase was successful in establishing the car-
bon market as well as the system for monitoring, reporting and verifying par-
ticipants’ emissions, it turned out that the number of allowances issued by the 
Member States was too high, and consequently, the quota price (which peaked 
at around 30 EUR in 2006) fell to zero in 2007 (European Commission 2019c).
In the second phase (2008-2012), the number of allowances was reduced (and 
the share of free allocations declined slightly, to around 90%), but the economic 
crisis which unfolded during this time meant that the energy use in the sectors 
41 With a certain number of permits set aside for potential new entrants – companies 
who start operating after the launch of the ETS and thus cannot receive any permits 
based on past emissions.
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covered, and thus the demand for emission allowances, declined even more, once 
again leading to an oversupply of permits and low permit prices. Another factor 
contributing to the oversupply of permits was the possibility for ETS participants 
to obtain a certain amount of additional allowances by buying credits under the 
Kyoto flexible mechanisms (CDM and JI). Other developments during this phase 
were Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland joining the EU ETS, and the extension of 
the system to include the aviation sector42 (European Commission 2019c). The 
latter step proved quite controversial because the EU initially wanted to include all 
flights to and from EU airports. This sparked huge resistance from industry as well 
as countries like the USA and China (The Economist 2012) and led to the scope of 
the ETS being limited to intra-EU flights.43 (The rules for airlines under the ETS are 
also different and less strict than for other sectors – see below.)
The third phase of the ETS (2013-2020) saw significant changes regarding 
the allocation of emission allowances. This was necessary because the over-
supply of permits and the low permit price in previous periods meant that the 
ETS was not successful in motivating substantial changes toward de-carbon-
isation. Therefore, in the third phase, the decision about the number of allow-
ances was moved to the EU level (instead of leaving this to Member States), 
and it was determined at the outset that this cap would decrease by 1.74% per 
year (except for the aviation sector, where it remains constant at 5% below the 
2004-2006 average emission level).
The other major change was shifting the method of allocating the permits gradu-
ally from free distribution to auctioning. This means that approximately 57% of al-
lowances issued during the third phase were auctioned. Free allocation remains 
dominant for the aviation sector (where 82% of permits were distributed for free) 
and for those industries where the risk of ‘carbon leakage’ is judged to be high. The 
term carbon leakage refers to the problem that, in industries faced with strong inter-
national competition, companies might decide to transfer their production outside 
the EU if the cost of complying with the ETS (i.e. buying permits) is too high (which 
would be detrimental from an environmental as well as an economic perspective).44 
42 Responsible for around 3% of the EU’s GHG emissions, aviation is currently not one 
of the largest emitters but needs to be addressed because the growth rate of emis-
sions is very high (European Commission 2019b).
43 This limitation is, in principle, temporary and conditional upon the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO) taking steps to effectively address CO2 emissions from 
international flights. The ICAO complied with this request by passing a resolution 
that, from 2020, airlines will be required to offset growth in their CO2 emissions (by 
buying credits from emission reduction projects such as renewable energy invest-
ments). (European Commission 2019b)
44 Sectors are deemed vulnerable to carbon leakage if the cost of buying permits 
would increase production costs by at least 5% AND the sector’s trade intensity 
with non-EU countries (imports and exports) is above 10%; or if either of the above 
is over 30% (European Commission 2019d).
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These sectors continue to receive their allowances for free, but the method of al-
location has changed from grandfathering to a system based on industrial bench-
marks, which rewards the most efficient companies (see Chapter 2.2.3). The third 
major group of participants, power plants, have not received any permits for free 
since 2013, with the exception of power plants in the new Member States of Central 
and Eastern Europe (European Commission 2016). The increase in the share of al-
lowances distributed via auction also means that the ETS now generates significant 
public revenue for Member States. The rules of the ETS require that at least 50% of 
this revenue be spent for climate-related purposes, and in practice many Member 
States have exceeded this obligation, reaching 80% on average (European Com-
mission 2018b).
However, even the new, tighter cap has not been able to solve the issue with 
the oversupply of permits that the ETS has been suffering from since the out-
set. This is because a large surplus of allowances was brought over (‘banked’) 
from the second phase, and also because companies are still able to obtain ad-
ditional allowances via CDM projects outside the EU (such international credits 
are comparatively cheap and are thus driving down the EU quota price). The EU 
initially attempted to solve the problem by postponing the auctioning of new al-
lowances (‘backloading’), but this was not sufficient to solve the problem and it 
became clear that only a permanent mechanism could be truly effective at ‘fixing’ 
the ETS. This mechanism, called the market stability reserve, was launched in 
January 2019 and works by automatically removing allowances from the market if 
the number of allowances in circulation exceeds a pre-determined amount (should 
the number of allowances on the market be too low, a certain amount will be auto-
matically released from the reserve) (European Commission 2018b). In anticipation 
of the launch of the market stability reserve, the price of quotas started increasing 
in 2018 and, as of May 2019, was around 25 EUR (see Figure 18). 
Figure 18 Evolution of the EU ETS quota price (EUR/t)
Source: Sandbag 2019
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The rules for the fourth phase of the ETS (2021-2030) were finalised in 2018 
and contain the following changes: the annual reduction in the number of al-
lowances issued will increase to 2.2% per year; the criteria for carbon leakage 
will be tightened, reducing the number of sectors eligible for free allowances; 
and companies will no longer be allowed to use international credits to fulfil 
their ETS obligations (European Commission 2018b).
Thanks to the new rules – notably the market stability reserve, which will 
drastically reduce the number of allowances in circulation over the next few 
years –, analysts are generally optimistic about the future performance of the 
ETS. Quota prices are expected to increase even further, reaching levels that 
may trigger significant change, mainly in the energy sector where a high price 
for carbon emissions threatens the viability of coal and lignite power plants. 
(The risk remains, of course, that in such a situation, political pressure from 
the heavily coal-dependent countries of Europe could lead to changes that 
weaken the system) (Stam 2018, Olsen 2019).
6.2. Effort sharing
Greenhouse gas emissions from other (individual) smaller sources that do not fall 
under the scope of the ETS (certain industries, as well as sectors such as build-
ings, transport, agriculture and waste) are regulated via the so-called ‘effort shar-
ing’ system. The term refers to the fact that for these sources, reduction targets are 
defined at the Member State level, determining the contribution expected of each 
country to the common effort of reducing GHG emissions. The overall goal for ef-
fort sharing sectors is a 10% reduction by 2020 and 30% by 2030 compared to 
2005 levels.45 The targets of individual Member States vary considerably depend-
ing on their level of economic development, with smaller reductions expected from 
countries with a lower GDP/capita (these economies are expected to grow faster 
and also have lower investment capacity, making it more difficult to cut emissions). 
As can be seen in Figure 19, the 2020 targets even allowed CEE countries to in-
crease their emissions. The national targets are mandatory, and progress toward 
them has to be made year by year in a linear fashion (with some limited flexibility 
between years). The effort sharing legislation also allows Member States to use 
flexibility mechanisms similar to the ones that exist under the Kyoto protocol to 
meet their obligations. Specifically, underperforming countries have the possibility 
to buy the ‘missing’ reduction credits from other Member States who were able to 
overachieve their target for the given year46 (European Commission 2018b).
45 The targets are set in a way that, together with reductions from the ETS sectors, they 
should deliver the total GHG reductions defined in the EU’s climate strategy.
46 Credits from certain types of CDM and JI projects can also be counted toward na-
tional targets, but this option will not be available after 2020.
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Figure 19 National GHG emission reduction targets under the effort sharing system
 
Source: based on EEA 2017
Reducing greenhouse gas emissions in sectors covered by effort sharing leg-
islation is primarily the responsibility of Member States, who may use a wide 
range of policy tools to achieve this (from making improvements to public trans-
port systems and promoting electric cars to supporting schemes for building 
renovation, climate-friendly agricultural practices, etc.) Nevertheless, several 
specific measures are also taken at the EU level which target GHG emissions in 
these sectors. The most important of these are presented below for each sector. 
6.2.1. Transport
As we have seen above (Figure 16, Figure 17), the transport sector is one of the 
most problematic areas from the point of view of climate change. Within trans-
port, road transport is the most important, causing nearly 75% of transport 
emissions (Eurostat 2018). Reducing the latter can be achieved through a wide 
array of measures, from promoting more environmentally friendly transport 
modes and alternative fuels to more efficient vehicles and using information 
technology to optimize the flow of traffic and various financial incentives (fuel 
taxes, road charges, etc.) to support these solutions. At the EU level, the two 
most important initiatives are the fuel efficiency standards for road vehicles 
and a mandate to increase the use of alternative energy in the transport sector.
The EU introduced mandatory fuel efficiency standards for new vehicles in the 
form of CO2 emission standards (in g/km) in 2009 (with a first deadline of 2015) 
for cars (Regulation 2009/443/EU) and in 2011 (with a first deadline of 2017) for 
vans (Regulation 510/2011/EU). The targets and the historic evolution of fuel 
efficiency for cars can be seen in Figure 20.47 (The numbers shown represent 
47 The targets correspond to fuel consumption of about 5.6 l/100 km for petrol and 4.9 
l/100 km for diesel cars for 2015 and 4.1 and 3.6 l /100 km in 2021 (European Com-
mission 2019e).
80 ANNA SZÉCHY: ENVIRONMENTAL AND CLIMATE POLICY
the EU-wide fleet average; targets for individual manufacturers can be higher or 
lower depending on the average mass of their vehicles, taking into account the 
fact that larger, heavier cars will always consume more fuel than small ones.) 
Figure 20 shows that the introduction of mandatory targets was able to signifi-
cantly foster the improving trend towards greater fuel efficiency.48  The targets for 
2030 were officially adopted in early 2019 (-37.5% for cars and -31% for vans 
from 2021 levels49) (Regulation 2019/631/EU), and, for the first time, the EU is 
also introducing CO2-related targets for heavy duty vehicles (trucks): -15% by 
2025 and -30% by 2030 (from 2019 levels) (European Commission 2018c).
Figure 20 Fuel efficiency trends and standards in the EU
 
Source: Mock 2017
Regarding alternative fuels, the currently best-established option is the use 
of biofuels. They represent the simplest solution regarding the use of renew-
able energy in the transport sector because they are compatible with the exist-
ing infrastructure (internal combustion engine cars, and fuel stations). How-
ever, it has been increasingly called into question over past years whether 
48 Prior to introducing the mandatory targets, the Commission sought to reduce CO2 
emissions from cars via a voluntary agreement with the European Automobile Manu-
facturers Association (ACEA) (European Commission 1999). However, industry failed 
to deliver the agreed reduction in time (the target was 140 g/km for 2008), leading the 
Commission to abandon the voluntary approach in favour of mandatory standards.
49 The new targets are defined as % reductions instead of absolute values because the offi-
cial vehicle testing procedures of the EU are currently undergoing reform and it is therefore 
not yet possible to know what the exact starting point in 2021 will be in g/km (Mock 2017).
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biofuels (notably, so-called ‘first generation’ biofuels made from food crops) 
can truly be considered environmentally sustainable and this has resulted in a 
shift in EU policy, as will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6.4.3.
The other solution that is now rapidly increasing in popularity is electric cars. 
These do not directly emit any air pollution and therefore have huge benefits in 
terms of urban air quality (as well as noise reduction). The amount of greenhouse 
gas emissions they cause is of course dependent on the source of the electricity 
they use, but in most cases it is also less than the emissions from conventional 
cars. A recent study (Moro-Lonza 2018) that compared GHG emissions from 
electric cars to petrol and diesel cars in the EU found that, on average, emis-
sions from the former are approximately 50% lower (see Figure 21). The figure 
also highlights the huge variations between Member States due to the different 
energy mixes. In countries that rely mostly on coal to generate electricity (such 
as Poland or Latvia) the usage of electric cars currently offers no climate benefit, 
while in countries with a high share of nuclear power or renewable sources (such 
as France, Sweden and Finland) it is much more favourable. It should also be 
noted that, as the share of renewables in electricity generation is expected to 
increase in the future, so will the CO2 reduction potential of electric cars.50
Figure 21 GHG emissions from electric vehicles in the EU compared to conventional cars
 
Source: Moro-Lonza 2018
50 In sufficiently large numbers, electric cars may themselves help to bring about the 
transition to renewable electricity because, while not in use, their batteries could be 
used for storing electricity. (Currently one of the main barriers to developing certain 
types of renewable electricity such as wind and solar is that their production is vari-
able and does not necessarily match demand, so finding ways to increase electricity 
storage capacities in a cost-effective manner is of key importance.)
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While the EU in principle supports the development of e-mobility, it has so 
far refrained from setting mandatory targets for the sale of electric cars (in the 
first quarter of 2019, their market share stood at 2.5% [ACEA 2019a] but this 
is expected to increase rapidly). However, the fuel economy standards dis-
cussed above represent strong pressure for car makers to sell more electric 
cars as they are otherwise unlikely to be able to reduce their fleet average 
CO2 emissions to the required level. In addition, the EU also requires Member 
States to increase the availability of charging infrastructure for electric as well 
as other alternative fuel vehicles (such as those that use hydrogen and com-
pressed or liquefied natural gas) (Directive 2014/94/EU).
As the car industry is of strategic importance in the EU (representing 6.8% 
of GDP, 6.1% of jobs and creating a sizable trade surplus [ACEA 2019b]), the 
above measures have not only environmental but also far-reaching economic 
and social implications and continue to be the subject of much heated debate. 
While environmental groups have, of course, campaigned for tighter CO2 stand-
ards and mandatory sales targets for electric cars (Transport & Environment 
2018), industry representatives have called the new targets highly demanding 
and unrealistic (ACEA 2018). Because electric cars are generally associated with 
a lower profit margin for carmakers, EU companies have so far not invested 
significantly in the area and now have to turn to China when importing batteries 
(which country, while no threat to EU companies when it comes to conventional 
cars, has been aggressively pushing electric cars in the last few years and now 
has the competitive advantage). In the near future, EU firms may even have to 
sell electric cars at a loss to meet CO2 standards or face heavy fines for exceed-
ing them51 (Campbell – McGee 2018). Industry experts therefore strongly criti-
cise EU decision makers for jeopardising profits and jobs in one of Europe’s last 
highly successful industrial sectors (Reuters 2019) – while environmental NGOs 
argue that, since electric cars likely represent the future of the industry, it also 
represents good economic strategy to push companies in that direction sooner 
rather than later (Transport & Environment 2018).
6.2.2. Buildings
Buildings (primarily because of their heating and cooling needs) are massive 
users of energy and are responsible for ~36% of the EU’s CO2 emissions. The 
51 Another important factor causing EU companies to end up in this position is the 
decline of diesel cars. These emit less CO2 than petrol cars and were an important 
part of the strategy of EU manufacturers to bring their fleets’ average emissions 
down. However, the diesel emissions scandal of 2015 resulted in many consumers 
turning away from the technology and buying petrol cars instead (a few years ago, 
diesel accounted for over half of new car sales in the EU, but this had fallen to 37% 
in 2018), causing an increase in fleetwide emissions and necessitating a reliance on 
electric cars that is greater than expected (Campbell – McGee 2018).
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energy performance of buildings varies widely – it is possible to build buildings 
that require little to no external energy input, and EU legislation mandates that 
all new buildings built after 2020 fall into this category (‘nearly zero-energy 
buildings’). However, the majority of the EU’s building stock is old and often 
highly inefficient, and it is of course not realistic to expect it will all be replaced 
within a few years or even decades. Therefore, the EU also has measures in 
place to promote the energy efficient renovation of existing buildings, including 
a mandatory annual renovation rate of 3% for government buildings (Directive 
2012/27/EU) and a requirement for all countries to draw up long-term renova-
tion strategies with targets and incentives to stimulate the renovation of build-
ings outside the government sector. It is also an EU requirement that owners 
provide energy performance certificates every time a building is sold or rented. 
(Directive 2018/844/EU)
6.2.3. Agriculture
Agriculture differs from other sectors in relation to climate change because 
most of its emissions do not result from fossil energy usage but from other 
processes, notably the usage of nitrogen-based fertilisers, the enteric fermen-
tation process of some animals (notably cattle and sheep), and manure man-
agement. The main greenhouse gases created in the sector are therefore N2O 
and CH4. The continuous reduction of emissions observable in the agricultural 
sector over the past decades (see Figure 16) can be mainly attributed to the 
reduction in fertiliser use and livestock numbers. (At the same time, the EU’s 
food imports have grown substantially, meaning that the GHG emission reduc-
tion in the EU was at least partly offset by growth in other parts of the world.) 
(Eurostat 2017)
The Common Agricultural Policy – one of the EU’s most important common 
policies, aimed at supporting farmers – has several elements that are relevant 
for climate change (and the environment in general).52 The direct payments 
provided under the CAP are linked to several environmental conditions, and 
grants awarded under the rural development heading are also available for 
environmental investments. The Commission estimates that approximately of 
25% of CAP payments during the period 2014-2020 are related to the promo-
tion of climate-friendly farming practices (European Commission 2015).
52 Aside from direct environmental aspects, the fundamental structure of the CAP is 
also of key importance – since 2003 most payments have been provided in the form 
of direct payments based on land area instead of market price support (as was previ-
ously the practice) which is clearly better for the environment because it no longer 
encourages increasing production.
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6.2.4. Waste management
Waste management contributes to GHG emissions primarily via the landfilling 
of biodegradable waste. Buried in landfills, waste degrades without the pres-
ence of oxygen, creating CH4 which is a more potent greenhouse gas than 
CO2. Burning waste in incinerators also leads to GHG emissions, but the re-
sulting energy can reduce the need for other energy sources and may therefore 
result in net benefits depending on the type of fuel that is replaced. Recycling 
waste is beneficial because it not only helps to reduce emissions resulting from 
other forms of waste management, but also the energy use associated with the 
production of virgin raw materials. For garden and food waste, the best option 
is composting, which avoids the creation of methane and results in valuable 
fertiliser (Smith et al. 2001).
The EU has a strong waste policy framework with mandatory national 
targets for increasing recycling rates, diverting biodegradable waste from 
landfills and collecting and neutralising CH4 emissions. As a result, GHG 
emissions from waste management operations have declined considerably 
in past decades (see Figure 16) and a further substantial reduction is ex-
pected thanks to new and ambitious waste targets adopted in 2018 (Direc-
tive 851/2018/EU). Notably, the proportion of municipal solid waste diverted 
to landfill in all EU Member States will have to be reduced to 10% by 2035 
(the deadline is 2040 for countries with high current landfill rates, such as 
Hungary), and separate waste collection extended to bio-waste (by 2023) 
and textiles (by 2025). The best option regarding waste is of course to pre-
vent its creation in the first place – in this area, the EU has not been very 
successful in the past due to ever increasing consumption levels. There are 
no concrete targets for reducing the amount of waste that may be generated, 
only guidelines and best practices to help Member States develop their own 
prevention programmes. One specific area that has received a lot of atten-
tion recently in the media and from the general public is plastic waste – the 
EU has responded to the issue by adopting a new directive on single-use 
plastics, including bans (effective from mid-2021) on some products such as 
plastic straws, cutlery, etc. and is encouraging Member States to reduce the 
usage of others (Directive 2019/904/EU).
6.3. Emissions from land use (LULUCF)
One area that is not covered either by the ETS or the effort-sharing system is 
the natural carbon sinks of Europe’s lands. Soils and vegetation store large 
amounts of carbon, and, depending on how they are managed, can help to 
mitigate emissions from other sectors or add to them further. Forests, for 
example, are estimated to absorb around 10% of the EU’s annual GHG emis-
sions, but action such as clearing forests, ploughing grasslands, or draining 
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peat bogs results in the release of GHGs into the atmosphere (European 
Commission 2019f). Currently, the balance of land emissions in the EU as a 
whole is negative, meaning the sector acts as a net carbon sink, removing 
over 300Mt CO2-eq annually from the atmosphere (this represents around 
7% of the EU’s current emissions), but the tendency over the past years 
has been unfavourable and is expected to continue in the near future (EEA 
2018a).
While the LULUCF sector was originally not included in the EU’s GHG emis-
sion statistics and targets, increasing international attention to the issue and 
the development of accounting methodology has led to the adoption of spe-
cific rules for the sector. As its central principle, the new LULUCF Regulation 
governing the period 2021-2030 (Regulation 2018/841/EU) adopts the ‘no-
debit’ rule, meaning that net emissions from the sector in all Member States 
must remain negative, so that any land-use changes that result in the release 
of GHGs will have to be offset by measures that result in the removal of at least 
an equivalent amount elsewhere in the sector.53
6.4. Renewable energy
Increasing the usage of renewable energy is key to reducing GHG emissions, 
and as we have seen above, has its own target of 20% by 2020 and 32% 
by 2030 (relative to final energy consumption). The 2020 target was broken 
down into different individual targets for each Member State, with more ex-
pected of countries where the share of renewable energy was already higher 
at the outset (Directive 2009/28/EC). It can be seen in Figure 22 that several 
Member States were able to meet their targets ahead of time, but the EU as a 
whole still has some way to go. The 2030 target was not defined at the Mem-
ber State level in the directive (Directive 2018/2001/EU) – instead, countries 
were required to submit national energy and climate plans specifying their 
targets and outlining the main measures they plan to implement in order to 
achieve them (Regulation 2018/1999/EU). These national plans must be ap-
proved by the Commission while the targets are expected to be finalised by 
the end of 2019.
53 A certain degree of flexibility is permitted between Member States, as well as be-
tween the LULUCF and the effort-sharing sectors.
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Figure 22 Share of renewable energy consumption in EU member states and targets for 2020s 
 
Source: EUROSTAT 2019a
The share of renewables in final energy consumption stood at 17.5% in 2017 
overall, up from 8.5% in 2004. The increase can be attributed to various policy 
measures as well as the rapidly falling price of many renewable energy tech-
nologies. The situation regarding renewables is very different in the three main 
energy-using sectors: heating and cooling, electricity, and transport – these 
will be described in the following sections. 
6.4.1. Heating and cooling
With a share of 30.2% in 2017, renewable energy is most prominent in the 
heating and cooling sector (EEA 2018a). The lion’s share comes from solid 
biomass (mostly various forms of firewood), which is used by households as 
well as district heating centres and industry; Figure 23). However, from an 
environmental point of view, biomass is not necessarily the most favourable 
source of energy, because burning it creates air pollution (particulate matter, 
CO, etc.), and, depending on the type and source of the biomass that is used, 
may contribute to biodiversity loss (deforestation). From the point of view of 
climate change, the use of biomass is theoretically neutral because while CO2 
is released into the atmosphere when the former is burned, the same amount 
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is removed as the plants grow.54 In practice, the use of biomass always results 
in some GHG emissions from processing and transport, but the amount is 
substantially lower than fossil-fuel-related emissions – the decisive factor is 
whether biomass stocks are managed sustainably (forests should not be har-
vested at a faster rate than they are able to grow).
Figure 23 Evolution of renewable energy usage in the heating and cooling sector in the EU 
 
Source: EEA 2018b
6.4.2. Electricity
The share of renewables in the EU’s total electricity consumption was 19.3% 
in 2017 (EEA 2018a). Sources here are far more diverse than in the heating 
sector (see Figure 24), with the previously dominant hydropower being over-
taken by rapidly growing wind energy in 2017. Solar energy (which is the most 
expensive type of renewable electricity) still plays only a minor role, but strong 
policy support and rapidly falling costs have resulted in high growth in the last 
decade. Biomass (solid and biogas) is also used for the generation of electric-
ity but is far less important here than in the heating sector. 
54 By contrast, burning fossil fuels releases CO2 into the atmosphere that has been 
stored underground for hundreds of millions of years.
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Figure 24 Evolution of renewable energy usage in the electricity sector in the EU 
 
Source: EEA 2018b
While solid biomass for heating is typically cheap enough to be a viable 
alternative to fossil fuels without public support, most forms of renewable 
electricity would not be able to attract investors without state subsidies. (Al-
though, as previously noted, costs are falling rapidly and an increasing number 
of renewable electricity projects are competitive on a purely market basis.) 
EU countries therefore all have public support schemes in place to spur the 
growth of renewable electricity. Designing these schemes is primarily within 
the competence of Member States, but the former must be in accordance with 
the rules for state aid laid down by the Commission (European Commission 
2014) to ensure that market distortions are kept to a minimum. As a general 
rule, the support that is provided should be as minimal as possible with the aim 
of reducing and removing it as renewable technologies mature and become vi-
able on their own. Furthermore, subsidies should be awarded on a competitive 
basis to drive efficiency improvements and reduce cost.
While investment grants are the typical form of support for renewable heat-
ing projects, in the electricity sector schemes that provide ongoing support 
for renewable electricity production are more common. These can also take 
several forms (CEER 2016):
•	 Price-based schemes work by allowing producers to sell electricity 
from renewable sources at prices above the market price.
o Feed-in-tariffs (FIT) guarantee a fixed price for renewable electric-
ity plant operators over a given period.
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o In the case of feed-in-premiums (FIP), producers sell their electric-
ity directly to the market (at variable prices) and additionally receive 
a premium as a support element.
 FIT schemes provide more certainty for investors while FIP programs 
are better at encouraging them to respond to short-term market sig-
nals, adjusting the volume of  production as needed (producers of solar 
and wind energy, which are dependent on the weather, are of course 
less able to do this than operators of biomass-based or hydro pow-
er plants). Both FIT and FIP can be provided through administrative 
procedures whereby eligible applicants are automatically awarded the 
higher price, or through tendering procedures whereby producers of 
renewable electricity compete with each other and only those who offer 
the lowest price are awarded support. 
 In the past, FITs and administrative procedures were most widespread, 
and have been able to considerably boost renewable electricity pro-
duction in Europe. However, in the case of administrative procedures, 
determining the necessary rate of support is challenging and failing to 
adjust rates to account for the rapidly decreasing costs of some renew-
able technologies (notably solar cells) has led to the overshooting of 
targets and excessive costs for electricity consumers in some coun-
tries. In recent years, in line with the new Commission requirements, 
there has been a strong shift toward FIPs and tender-based systems to 
encourage better market integration and cost-efficiency in the renew-
able electricity sector. (Many countries, including Hungary, now have 
mixed schemes with automatically awarded FITs for smaller installa-
tions and tender-based premiums for the largest ones.) (CEER 2018)
•	 The	 alternative	 to	 price-based	 support	 systems	 are	 quantity-based 
schemes, commonly called green certificates. In this case, it is the 
amount of green electricity that is determined by the authorities, while 
the price freely floats on the market (similarly to pollution control 
schemes based on tradable permits). Producers of renewable electric-
ity must sell their electricity on the market for the regular price, but they 
receive green certificates after the amount they produce that they can 
also sell, and this provides them with extra income. Demand for the 
green certificates is created by placing a legal duty on participants of 
the electricity market to purchase a certain amount of the former (cor-
responding to the share of renewable electricity that policymakers wish 
to support).
 While this system allows authorities to better control the amount of green 
electricity and also creates competition among providers, for the provid-
ers themselves it results in a far more uncertain environment than price-
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based systems (because of the volatility of market prices for the green 
certificates). As a result, only a handful of European countries are currently 
operating green certificate schemes (Hamburger – Harangozó 2018).
The support schemes described above are relevant for commercial-scale 
installations. However, some renewable electricity technologies (such as solar 
cells) can also be deployed on a much smaller, household scale. Promoting 
such decentralised production is an important aim of the EU’s new renewable 
energy directive (Directive 2018/2001/EU). This requires Member States to re-
move administrative barriers and discriminatory practices that currently make 
it difficult or unattractive for consumers in many countries to produce their own 
electricity and sell their surplus to the grid. It also lays down a framework for 
the creation of renewable energy communities that allow such small players to 
unite and maximise their benefits.
6.4.3. Transport
Standing at 7.2% in 2017, the share of renewable energy in the transport 
sector is considerably lower than in the other two areas and also significantly 
lagging behind the trajectory needed to achieve the 2020 target of 10% (EEA 
2018a). As mentioned in Chapter 6.2.1, the main renewable energy sources 
used in the transport sector are biofuels. (The other currently existing alterna-
tive is renewable electricity, but since the market share of electric cars is still 
very low, and even these only use renewable electricity to the extent that it is 
present in the energy mix of each country, that option only accounts for a very 
small part of renewables in the transport sector - although in the future it is 
likely to grow.)
The EU’s approach to biofuels represents one of the very rare instances when 
policymakers essentially performed an about-turn and completely changed their 
goals within just a few years. Initially, biofuels were considered an environmen-
tally friendly option because of their renewable nature and perceived climate 
benefit. The target for 2020 was put in place and measures were adopted across 
EU Member States to promote the production and use of biofuels.55 However, 
this policy was increasingly criticised by environmental groups who called into 
question the benefits of biofuel usage. The main reason for the criticism is that 
today’s biofuels are primarily made from food crops (so-called first-generation 
biofuels)56 and their production requires high energy input (fertilisers, tractors, 
processing, etc.), which means that they are far from being climate-neutral. Con-
55 The key instrument applied in many countries is blending obligations that require 
companies that sell motor fuels to use a certain percentage of biofuel in their prod-
ucts.
56 Biodiesel is made from oily plants such as sunflowers, rapeseed and oil palm, while 
biogasoline/bioethanol comes from crops with a high sugar content such as corn.
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verting natural areas to agricultural land for the sake of biofuel production is 
also clearly detrimental to the environment. The Commission reacted to these 
criticisms by introducing so-called ‘sustainability criteria’ for biofuels (Directive 
2009/30/EC), mandating that only biofuels that make a certifiable GHG emission 
saving of at least 35% (later increased to 50% and 60%) can be considered 
towards the target, and that they must not be produced on natural areas. (This 
change caused the drop in use of biofuels that occurred in 2011, observable in 
Figure 25, which only shows biofuels that meet the sustainability criteria.)
Figure 25 Evolution of renewable energy usage in the transport sector in the EU
 
Source: EEA 2018b
However, the new rules were not enough to lay concerns to rest as they did not 
address a very important aspect of the problem: indirect land-use change (ILUC). 
This refers to the fact that even if the biofuels themselves are not produced on land 
that is converted from natural areas, the increasing demand for these commodi-
ties may nevertheless drive agricultural expansion. The prime example of this is 
palm oil, which is very widely used in the food and cosmetics industry, the rapidly 
growing demand for which is one of the leading causes of deforestation in South-
east Asia. Using palm oil as biofuel (or indeed any other vegetable oil such as 
rapeseed or sunflower oil, which are substitutes with largely the same uses) adds 
to this demand and results in more deforestation, with negative consequences 
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for biodiversity as well as GHG emissions. Because of its indirect nature, ILUC is 
notoriously difficult to quantify, which is the reason why it was not included in the 
methodology for calculating GHG emission savings in the Commission’s sustain-
ability criteria. However, a growing number of studies show that it is indeed a 
major factor which may completely undermine the promise of biofuels, especially 
biodiesel (which accounts for the majority of biofuel use in the EU; see Figure 25) 
as a climate-friendly option. (Figure 26 shows that if the ILUC is taken into ac-
count, the GHG emissions from biodiesel are equivalent to or even greater than 
emissions from fossil fuels.) (Transport & Environment 2019)
Figure 26 Studies about the GHG impact (including ILUC) of various types of biofuels
Source: Transport & Environment 2019
This has led to the Commission fundamentally reconsidering its approach to-
ward food-based biofuels, whose contribution toward the target is now limited 
to 7% of transport energy consumption (Directive 2015/1513/EU). Furthermore, 
biofuels deemed to be a high risk of ILUC will be completely phased out by 2030 
(they can still be used, but will not count towards renewable energy targets) 
(Directive 2018/2001/EU). The decision as to which biofuels will be classified as 
high risk is still not final (as of May 2019), with the Commission naming palm oil 
(but not soy and other types of biodiesel) and defining certain exceptions under 
which some palm oil may still be accepted.57 Instead of biofuels made from food 
57 The cause of the prolonged debate about this issue has to do with the sensitivity 
surrounding the topic for exporting countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia, who 
have gone so far as to threaten retaliatory trade measures (Valero 2019). (While the 
decision to classify soy as low risk was condemned by environmentalists, it was 
welcomed by its main exporter, the USA.) (Michalopoulos 2019)
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crops, the EU is now promoting so-called advanced biofuels which have a much 
better environmental profile (see Figure 26) but which are also more expensive 
and are currently being used in only very small amounts (see ‘other biofuels’ in 
Figure 25). These benefit from multipliers (meaning they can be counted more 
than once) when determining Member States’ progress toward the transport 
renewable energy targets.58
While certainly justified from an environmental point of view, this unusually 
sudden shift in policy has created difficulties for investors who were previously 
encouraged to develop biofuel production capacity. Strangely, the new regula-
tions do not make a general distinction between biodiesel and bioethanol, the 
latter which appears to be far more environmentally beneficial than fossil fuels 
even if ILUC is taken into account. This approach is in line with the view of 
environmental groups, who see renewable electricity (and perhaps advanced 
biofuels) as the best way to decarbonise transport. Industry representatives, 
on the other hand, stress that such a transition will necessarily be slow, while 
first generation ethanol represents a readily available solution for quickly start-
ing to cut transport emissions (Fortuna 2018).
6.5. Energy efficiency
Among the EU’s 2020 climate and energy targets, meeting the energy efficien-
cy goal currently appears to be most problematic (see Figure 15). While energy 
consumption is still below 2005 levels (by 9.2% in 2017), it has been increasing 
since 2014 and it appears unlikely to decline sufficiently to meet the target in 
time (Eurostat 2019b). Past reductions can mainly be attributed to structural 
changes in the European economy (an increase in the share of the service sec-
tor at the expense of more energy intensive industrial activities) and efficiency 
improvements in individual sectors (industries as well as the residential sector), 
while the transport sector has only been able to achieve modest results.59 And, 
in recent years, efficiency improvements have not been able to keep pace with 
stronger economic growth, leading to the observable increase in total energy 
consumption (EEA 2018a).
It has long been observed by economists that there is generally much less 
investment in energy efficiency than would be optimal for society given the 
potential for economic and environmental benefits (and indeed less than what 
would be justified from a purely financial perspective) – this phenomenon is 
58 The multipliers result in a very complicated system, and also mean that Member 
States can officially meet the 14% target for renewable energy in transport in 2030 
with a share of renewable energy that is significantly lower.
59 Energy consumption (mainly in the residential sector) is of course also heavily influ-
enced by the weather, notably winter temperatures that determine heating needs.
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known as the ‘energy efficiency gap’ or ‘energy efficiency paradox’. There are 
several explanations for the existence of this gap, such as limited access to 
capital (as the up-front costs of energy efficiency investments are often high), 
a lack of consumer awareness, and the fact that energy prices do not reflect 
their full social and environmental cost (on the contrary, many countries even 
have subsidies for the production and consumption of energy that reduce their 
cost and further distort the market). Given this situation, policy intervention is 
essential for promoting energy efficiency, although the EU’s requirements in 
this area are relatively weak (Zgajewski 2014).
The framework is designed so that individual Member States set their own 
energy efficiency targets which together are intended to deliver the overall EU 
target (but are, in fact, less ambitious overall) (EEA 2018a). The main problem 
is that, unlike effort sharing and renewable energy targets, national energy ef-
ficiency targets are non-binding (this is the case for the 2020 targets as well 
as the new ones for 2030). This means that countries that fail to meet their 
targets will not have to face any sanctions, and this may be a factor behind the 
insufficient level of progress. The energy efficiency directive of 2012 (Directive 
2012/27/EU) does contain a binding obligation for Member States to reduce fi-
nal energy consumption by 1.5% per year until 2020; however, several exemp-
tions, forms of flexibility in implementation, and problems with the monitoring 
and verification of savings make this requirement much weaker in practice 
(Rosenow et al. 2016).
Alongside the general targets, EU energy efficiency policy also includes 
various sector-specific measures which have been able to successfully drive 
energy savings. Alongside the requirements for buildings described in Chap-
ter 6.2.2, there are energy efficiency standards for several product categories 
such as light bulbs, boilers and air conditioners, pumps, transformers and a 
wide range of household appliances (refrigerators, washing machines, etc.) 
(Directive 2009/125/EC). For many products, the EU has not only minimum 
energy efficiency requirements but also a mandatory labelling system which 
enables consumers to choose products that consume less energy (Regulation 
2017/1369/EU). In other areas, there are no mandatory technology standards, 
but there is an obligation to conduct assessments in order to make sure that 
the potential for improving energy efficiency is not overlooked. Large com-
panies are required to conduct an energy audit every four years and, in the 
power sector, the opportunity to use highly efficient co-generation60 technolo-
gies must be examined any time a heat or electrical installation is built or refur-
bished (Directive 2012/27/EU).
60 Cogeneration means the simultaneous production of electricity and useful heat. In 
conventional thermal power plants, the heat generated during the production of 
electricity is lost – utilising this ‘waste’ heat in district heating systems or industry 
can result in huge energy savings.
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